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NINETEENTH CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONTRACT CLAUSE: THE TRANSFORMATION FROM
VESTED TO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AGAINST THE STATE*
JAMES L. KAINEN**
INTRODUCTION
During the early nineteenth century, the contract clause
served as the fundamental source of federally protected rights
against the state.' Yet the Supreme Court gradually eased many of
the restrictions on state power enforced in the contract clause
cases while developing the doctrine of substantive due process af-
ter the Civil War. By the end of the nineteenth century, the due
process clause had usurped the place of the contract clause as the
centerpiece in litigation about individual rights.
Most analyses of the history of federally protected rights
against the state have emphasized the rise of substantive due pro-
cess to the exclusion of the diminishing significance of the contract
clause.2 As a consequence, explanations for the evolution of rights
* Copyright 0 1983, James L. Kainen. Thanks to the friends and colleagues who have
commented on portions of this Article. The bulk of the essay was written while I was
teaching at the Center for Law and Liberal Education, Brown University, for whose support
I am grateful. Special thanks to Duncan Kennedy, who commented on the entirety of this
and previous drafts and whose unpublished manuscript, The Rise and Fall of Classical
Legal Thought: 1850-1940 (on file with the Buffalo Law Review), inspired the investigation
of the relationship between the contract clause cases and the doctrine of vested rights. The
chapter entitled "Pre-Classical Rights Against the State" was particularly helpful to me in
understanding the significance of vested rights in antebellum legal thought.
** Associate, Kreindler & Kreindler, New York, New York. A.B., Brown University,
1975; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978.
1. Art. I, sec. 10 of the Constitution reads, "No State shall.. .pass any .. Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts." The standard references upon which I have relied include
B. F. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938) and Hale, The Supreme
Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv. L. REV. 512-57, 621-74, 852-92 (1944).
2. Contra McGurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Re-
lations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIsT.
970 (1974-75). Professor McGurdy discusses Field's contribution to post-bellum contract
clause doctrine in the course of showing that "Field's approach to ... constitutional contro-
versies was more than a narrow philosophy of the bank account.. . . [H]e refused to pro-
vide a harbor where refuge can be found for the inconsistent claims of a particularistic inter-
est group." Id. at 1004.
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against the state generally attempt to account only for the ways in
which the late nineteenth century Court expanded upon the con-
stitutional restraints imposed by the Marshall and Taney Courts.
A survey of the cases decided under the contract and due pro-
cess clauses, however, reveals the late nineteenth century Court
permitting exercises of state power previously thought to infringe
upon constitutional rights, while limiting state power in ways pre-
viously thought unacceptable. Even some of the most "conserva-
tive" late nineteenth century Justices urged the reversal of the
Marshall Court's most important contract clause precedents, not
because the fourteenth amendment rendered them unnecessary,
but because they had been wrongly decided. An account for the
evolution of federal judicial protection for rights against the state
should explain this development as well as the rise of substantive
due process.
This Article's thesis is that the development and eventual
evisceration of contract clause doctrine can be explained by refer-
ence to the process by which the substantive right came to displace
the vested right as the central concept in legal thought about
rights against the state. The doctrines developed under the con-
tract clause were formed by a decision to protect only those prop-
erty and contract rights that were conceived to have vested against
subsequent legislative interference. That decision, about the sort of
property and contract rights that were sufficiently "legal" to be
protected by judicial review of legislative power, reflected a con-
sensus among the antebellum legal elite on the justiciability of the
vested right. In contrast to that consensus was a disagreement
about the justiciability of substantive rights, represented by such
antebellum luminaries as Marshall, Story, and Kent, which grew
more acute with the gradual recognition of the incoherence of the
boundary doctrines developed to determine when an individual
property or contract right had vested. One consequence of this
gradual disintegration was the recasting of protected property and
contract rights as substantive rights against the state.
Part I of this Article presents the Marshall Court's major con-
tract clause holdings and summarizes their demise in the late nine-
teenth century. It then outlines previous explanations of these
cases, grounded in the prevalence of beliefs in natural law or posi-
tivism and formal or instrumental styles of legal reasoning, and
demonstrates their inability to account for the disintegration of
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contract clause doctrine. Finally, it sketches an alternative ap-
proach which focuses on the changing beliefs in the meaningful-
ness of the doctrines actually employed by the Court to analyze
the cases.
Part II argues that contract clause doctrine was the result of
two central decisions: One, the decision to confine judicial review
to vested rights, and two, the decision to limit federal jurisdiction
over vested rights. It then contrasts this explanation with the al-
ternative explanations.
Part III traces the history of the concept of vested rights. It
begins with a statement of the analytics underlying the concept
and describes the central distinctions between "rights" and "reme-
dies" and "property rights" and "expectancies" which were em-
ployed as boundary doctrines to determine whether a legal interest
had vested. It then explains the demise of the vested right in con-
stitutional analysis as the result of the gradual accumulation of a
critique of the meaningfulness of the vested right boundary
doctrines.
Finally, Part IV relates the unravelling of contract clause doc-
trine in the late nineteenth century to the collapse of the concept
of vested rights. It concludes with a brief suggestion of how this
collapse contributed to the protection of substantive rights.
I. THE SHIFT FROM THE CONTRACT CLAUSE TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
A. The Major Contract Clause Holdings and Their Demise
The Marshall Court rendered its major contract clause hold-
ings in Fletcher v. Peck,3 Dartmouth College v. Woodward,4 and
Ogden v. Saunders.5 In Fletcher, the Court invalidated a statute
repealing a prior land grant, holding in part that the repealing act
impaired a contract embodied in the grant. Fletcher was the sec-
ond case in which the full Court exercised the power of judicial
review and the first in which the Court struck down a state
statute.'
In Dartmouth College, the Court invalidated a statute amend-
3. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 519 (1819).
5. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
6. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
383
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ing a corporate charter on the ground that the charter embodied a
contract whose obligation was impaired by the amendment. In
terms of subsequent contract clause cases, the holding of
Dartmouth College was the most significant, since it established
clear federal jurisdiction over the vested rights of corporations.'
The Court in Ogden v. Saunders held that the contract clause
protected only existing contract rights from retrospective invasion
and did not protect against regulation of the right to make subse-
quent contracts. The Court was considering a challenge to a state
bankruptcy law and, over a dissent by Marshall, held that the act
impaired only those debts incurred prior to its enactment and did
not impair debts incurred subsequent to the passage of the act.'
By the end of the nineteenth century, each of these holdings
had been substantially overruled, as the doctrine of substantive
due process came to replace the analysis previously employed
under the contract clause. Perhaps the most striking example of
the undermining of the analysis adduced in Fletcher and
Dartmouth is the seeming reversal of the Supreme Court's position
towards rate regulation between the Railroad Commission Cases"
of 1886 and the Minnesota Rate Cases0 of 1890. While in the for-
mer cases the Court held that a corporate charter giving a railroad
corporation the power to set reasonable rates did not prohibit the
state from later establishing a commission to determine reasona-
bleness of the rates set by the company, in the latter cases, the
Court held that the rates set by a railroad commission were subject
to federal judicial review under the fourteenth amendment on the
evolving theory, brought to fruition in Smyth v. Ames,"" that un-
reasonable rates violated due process.
Although the Court in the Railroad Commission Cases has
been viewed as merely applying the doctrine of strict construction
of legislative grants (a doctrine traceable to Marshall himself), it is
clear that it exhibited an attitude towards the contract clause far
removed from that of Marshall's.1 2 In Fletcher, Marshall had ar-
7. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 519 (1819).
8. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
9. Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. [Railroad Cases], 116 U.S. 307 (1886).
10. Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
11. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The Court in Smyth held that the company was entitled to a
reasonable return on the fair value of its property.
12. Wright notes that the doctrine of strict construction was suggested by opinions of
the Marshall Court and, although it was used by the Taney Court, its effects were not felt
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gued that a legislative grant implied a contract not to exercise
state power so as to infringe upon the rights embodied in the
grant.'3 In the Railroad Commission Cases, Chief Justice Waite ar-
gued that the railroad's right to set reasonable rates was not pro-
tected unless the legislature had also expressly surrendered the
power to alter subsequently that right.14 In dissent, Justice Harlan
noted that Waite's reading was strict construction with a ven-
geance; the Court read the charter as if it had no provision at all
for setting rates.15 The decision laid the foundation for the result
in the Minnesota Rate Cases and virtually guaranteed that in the
future most significant litigation about rate regulation would be
brought under the due process clause, where the issue of the rea-
sonableness of the regulation replaced litigation about the scope of
the company's chartered rights.
A second example of the disintegration of contract clause doc-
trine as enunciated in Dartmouth is the Court's creation and sub-
sequent application of the doctrine of the inalienable police power.
In a series of cases beginning shortly after the Civil War, the Court
held that regulations imposed under the police power could over-
ride any rights claimed under a corporate charter."6 In cases in
which legislatures had ordered improvements in dangerous condi-
tions associated with various corporate enterprises, the Court in-
creasingly permitted the state to order that improvements be made
at the corporation's expense, even in the face of a charter provision
arguably exempting the corporation from this kind of liability."
Professor McGurdy has shown how the inalienable police
power also seemed to underlie the Court's development of the pub-
lic trust doctrine with respect to natural resources, a doctrine
until after Taney's death. B.F. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 63.
13. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137.
14. 116 U.S. at 330.
15. Id. at 341.
16. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde
Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878); Boyd v. Alabama, 94
U.S. 645 (1877).
17. Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Du-
luth, 208 U.S. 583 (1908); Missouri ex rel. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 170 U.S. 78
(1898); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1898); New York & N. Eng. R.R. v.
Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894); New York ex rel. N.Y. Elec. Lines v. Squire, 145 U.S. 175
(1892). The Court used the reserved power to amend the corporate charters as an alterna-
tive ground for decision in some of these cases.
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which amounted to a reversal of Fletcher.18 In Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Court held void a state grant convey-
ing lands underlying navigable waters on the theory that the land
was a "public highway" held in trust for the benefit of all users.
The Court thus permitted the state to repossess the land despite
the charge that the repossession violated the contract clause.19 In
retrospect, the inalienable police power also seems to be the un-
stated premise of the Railroad Commission Cases; although the
Court was not willing to hold that the power to regulate rates was
part of the inalienable police power, it "construed" corporate char-
ters to achieve a similar result.20 The inalienable police power doc-
trine thus assured that most significant regulatory issues would be
litigated under the due process clause where the issue became the
scope of the police power, and not the extent of the corporation's
chartered rights.
A third example of the shift to the due process clause is the
Court's treatment of tax exemptions previously protected under
the contract clause.21 As early as 1869, three Justices of the Su-
preme Court urged the reversal of New Jersey v. Wilson,22 the case
in which the Marshall Court had brought tax exemptions within
the protective ambit of the contract clause, on the theory that the
taxing power was also inalienable.23 Although the Court never re-
versed Wilson, it "invoke[d] all doctrinal weapons short of revers-
ing" it.2 4 The "weapons" included finding that the state had not
received consideration for the exemption, construing the exemp-
tions narrowly, and holding them forfeit when a corporation hold-
ing an exemption reorganized. 25 As a result, the issue of the scope
of the taxing power, like that of the scope of the police power, was
litigated under the evolving doctrine of substantive due process.
The decision of Pearsall v. Great Northern Railway also cut
deeply into the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case by holding
that an express grant to a corporation of the power to combine and
consolidate with other corporations was repealable as long as the
18. McGurdy, supra note 2, at 933.
19. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
20. 116 U.S. at 325-33.
21. See the cases collected in B.F. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 179-94.
22. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
23. Home of the Friendless v. Rousse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430, 443 (1869).
24. McGurdy, supra note 2, at 992.
25. B.F. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 179-94.
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power remained "unexecuted."26 Taking his cue from Justice
Brown's exhaustive review of the contract clause cases in Pearsall,
Seymour Thompson, a well known legal commentator and former
state court judge, wrote a book about the history of the Dartmouth
College doctrine in which the main thesis was that the develop-
ments detailed above amounted to an inevitable and salutary trend
towards the reversal of the holding in that case.
Finally, while loosening the major restrictions on state power
imposed by the Marshall Court, the late nineteenth century Court
also reversed the major limitation on judicial review of individual
rights established in Ogden. Commencing with Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana,28 the Court began to invalidate prospective regulations of
contracts. The legal protection of the right to enter into subse-
quent contracts reached fruition in Lochner v. New York 29 and
Adair v. United States,30 in which the Court held that the due
process clause protected against unreasonable regulation the right
to make whatever contracts the parties willed.
Developments in late ninetenth century contract clause doc-
trine thus indicate that by the end of the century the major con-
tract clause holdings of the Marshall Court were well on the way to
becoming "judicial relic[s]." 31 In addition, when viewed in the long
run, the change in the formal justification for restrictions on state
power imposed by the federal courts made a significant impact on
the outcomes of the cases. Substantive due process did not merely
add to the list of restrictions on legislative power; the ideas which
produced the new restrictions also significantly undermined re-
strictions enforced under the contract clause.
B. Previous Explanations for the Disintegration of Contract
Clause Doctrine
Insofar as previous explanations of nineteenth century federal
judicial review of individual rights focus only on the ways in which
substantive due process expanded upon restrictions applied under
26. 161 U.S. 646 (1896).
27. S. THOMPSON, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE (1898).
28. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
29. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
31. The phrase is C. Peter McGrath's. C.P. McGRATH, YAzoo: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
NEw REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK 109 (1966).
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the contract clause, they are seriously imprecise. A survey of the
major explanations suggests that this imprecision is more than a
matter of omission. An alternative description of the ideas influen-
tial in nineteenth century judicial review which accounts for the
demise of the limitations enforced under the contract clause, in ad-
dition to the growth of substantive due process, challenges a cen-
tral premise of previous explanations: their common assumption
that it is possible to explain the cases by reference to the necessary
implications of what modern legal thinkers understand as contra-
dictory beliefs about the nature of law or commitments to incom-
patible styles of legal reasoning.
The first efforts to account for the evolution of federal judicial
protection for rights against the state focused upon prevailing be-
liefs about the nature of law. Relying on the opposition between a
natural law and a positivist jurisprudence, Edward Corwin and
Charles Grove Haines described the evolution of federal constitu-
tional restrictions as a continuous struggle between beliefs in natu-
ral rights and legislative sovereignty.3 2 They attempted to demon-
strate a correlation between periods of increased federal protection
for individual rights and the scope and intensity of natural rights
(higher law) thinking, and a corresponding correlation between less
active judicial intervention and the ascendancy of positivist theo-
ries of law. They attributed the initial period of contract clause
expansion (prior to Ogden) and the development of substantive
due process to the dominance of natural rights thinking and ac-
counted for the interim period by referring to the rise of Jackso-
32. Major works in this tradition with which I am familiar include E.S. CORWIN: THE
"HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955) [hereinafter cited as
"HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND]; LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948) [hereinafter cited as
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT]; THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934) [hereinafter
cited as THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT]; The Basic Doctrine of American Constitu-
tional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247 (1914) [hereinafter cited as Basic Doctrine]; The Doctrine
of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 440 (1911) [hereinafter
cited as The Doctrine of Due Process]; The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1909) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court and the Four-
teenth Amendment]; and C.G. HAINES: THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
(1932) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN DOCTRINE]; THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS
(1930) [hereinafter cited as REVIVAL]; THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AIERICAN GOV-
ERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835 (1960) [hereinafter cited as ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT]. For statements conceptualizing the conflict between legislative sovereignty and nat-
ural rights, see LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, supra, at 59-68; REVIVAL, supra, at 80-86;
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra, at 9-49; Basic Doctrine, supra, at 247.
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nian democracy and the ascendancy of theories of legislative
sovereignty. 33
More recently, scholars writing in this tradition have begun to
revise the version of the conflict between natural law and positiv-
ism employed by Haines and Corwin. Responding to increasing ev-
idence that early nineteenth century legal thinkers took seriously
the theory that judicial enforcement of written constitutions was
consistent with popular sovereignty, Professors Tribe and Ely
reconceptualized the jurisprudential conflict as between natural
law and constitutional positivism.34 The concept of constitutional
positivism views judicial protection of certain individual rights as
fully consistent with democratic theory. Hence, active judicial re-
view of at least some individual rights is not necessarily attributed
to beliefs in natural law.
Ely argues that constitutional positivism comprises "interpre-
tivism," the protection of rights expressly stated in the text, plus
the protection of the democractic process through the enforcement
of rights ensuring relatively equal "access to the processes and
bounty of representative government."3 5 In opposition, conceptions
of natural law include protection for certain rights denominated by
the courts as fundamental.3 6 Ely invokes these concepts to argue
that the early contract clause cases are not attributable to natural
law theories at all; instead, he argues that they are fully consistent
33. Chapter II of TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 32, The Property Right
versus Legislative Power in a Democracy, contains a succinct statement of Corwin's argu-
ment. For a summary of Corwin's work, see Mason & Garvey, Introduction to E.S. CORWIN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1964). Haines' argument appears in REVIVAL, supra
note 32, at 75-165 and in ROLE OP THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 32, at 323-29, 579-90,
623-30.
34. J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1978). Two recent accounts of the ways in which early nineteenth century legal think-
ers incorporated the idea of constitutional restrictions into positivist theories of law are G.
WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AmERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); and Nelson, Changing
Conceptions of Judicial Review in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972).
Although Corwin noted that the written Constitution was associated with popular sover-
eignty, he argued that natural rights theories governed the Court's interpretation of the
written Constitution. In discussing the famous exchange between Justices Chase and Iredell
in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), Corwin asserted that the victory for Iredell's
position on the illegitimacy of appealing to restrictions not expressly stated in the text was a
purely formal one which disguised a substantive victory for the natural rights theorists. Lm-
ERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, supra note 32, at 59-64.
35. J.H. ELY, supra note 34, at 74.
36. Id. at 1-9, 48-54, 73-75.
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with judicial beliefs in constitutional positivism.37 Ely then por-
trays late nineteenth century substantive due process as attributa-
ble to a desire on the part of judges to protect fundamental val-
ues-a procedure whose legitimation, at least in the context of the
time period, depended upon an underlying jurisprudential belief in
natural rights.3 8
Tribe offers a more complex explanation. He argues that the
earliest contract clause cases evidenced a desire to protect vested
economic rights independent of textual basis. Nonetheless, by 1830
(again Ogden seems to provide the dividing line) the Court had
settled on an interpretation of the contract clause largely consis-
tent with constitutional positivism.3 9 Tribe argues that the ante-
bellum court for the most part assumed that the division and sepa-
ration of powers provided sufficient protection for individual rights
and that the continuation of contract clause protection after
Ogden represented only a minimal concession to natural rights
thinking embodied in what he calls the model of "settled expecta-
tions." 0 Tribe then depicts an upsurge in natural rights theories
37. Ely argues that Marshall's opinion in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213
(1827), is consistent with constitutional positivism. J.H. ELY, supra note 34, at 209-11 n.41.
Since this opinion had previously been interpreted as containing Marshall's most explicit
statement of his natural rights philosophy (see, e.g., Issac, John Marshall on Contracts: A
Study in Early American Juristic Theory, 7 U. VA. L. REV. 413 (1921)), the implication is
that all the Marshall Court's contract clause cases can be accommodated within the model
of constitutional positivism. Ely concludes:
(F]or early American lawyers, references to natural law and natural rights func-
tioned as little more than signals for one's sense that the law was not as one felt
it should be. This is not to say that "natural law" was without perceived legal
significance. It was thought to be invocable interstitially, when no aspect of posi-
tive law provided the applicable rule for the case at hand. But it was subordinate
to applicable statutes and well-settled precedent as well as to constitutional pro-
visions, and not generally perceived as a source of values on whose basis positive
law could be constitutionally upset.
J.H..ELY, supra note 34, at 50.
38. J.H. ELY, supra note 34, at 14-21, 228 n.91, 213 n.66.
39. Tribe writes, "[i]n these early nineteenth century [contract clause] cases, the Su-
preme Court was less concerned to locate the protection of vested economic rights in a par-
ticular clause of the Constitution than to define such rights and to defend them in the name
of the fundamental law.. . ." L. TRIE, supra note 34, at 456-57. Tribe then depicts Mar-
shall's defeat in Ogden as a defeat for his theory that contractual obligations arose "prior to
the social compact itself." Id. at 467. He attributes the early cases to a "breathing space"
between the 1780s when "colonial legislation had slipped from its early Seventeenth century
pinnacle as the expression of reason" and the late 1820s when "adjudication joined legisla-
tion in the subjective pit of will and power." Id. at 11.
40. Tribe argues that in applying the contract clause after Ogden, the Court did not
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after the Civil War, the effect of which was finally felt as substan-
tive due process when the Court developed a model of "implied
limitations," with no substantial basis in the Constitutional text,
which did not threaten prevailing views of federalism.41 Despite his
use of the concept of constitutional positivism, Tribe's picture of
the impact of the ebb and flow between the opposing theories of
law in the cases is strikingly similar to that of Haines and Corwin.
These interpretations of the relationship between the out-
comes of the individual rights cases and prevailing beliefs in natu-
ral law or positivism fail to account adequately for the rise of sub-
stantive due process and the parallel demise of the contract clause.
Haines and Corwin portray the shift from the contract clause to
substantive due process as reflecting a juicial desire to seek a
"more secure anchor for individual rights" after the contract clause
had been restricted during the positivist period or as illustrating a
judicial attempt to construct further limitations upon state
power.42 Neither explanation, however, accounts for the diminish-
ing solicitude for the restrictions on state power previously en-
forced under the contract clause. Similarly, Tribe's explanation of
both the early contract clause cases and the substantive due pro-
cess cases as traceable to natural rights theories leaves unexplained
why the later Court dismantled rather than reinvigorated Mar-
shall's handiwork. If the model of settled expectations represented
a minimal concession to natural rights thinking and the later
model of implied limitations was a full-blown natural rights theory,
it is not clear why the latter replaced, rather than supplemented,
the former.
Ely's emphasis on interpretative and non-interpretative mod-
els, while perhaps useful in the ongoing normative debate about
the proper constitutional theory, is far too broad to account for the
developments described above or even for the outcomes observed
in either period. For instance, Ely argues that Justice Johnson's
concurrence in Fletcher, appealing to a "principle which will im-
follow fully a positivist theory of the obligation of contracts. Instead of protecting only the
rights parties to an agreement would expect under the positive law, the Court protected
rights it thought the parties were entitled to expect. Id. at 467-69.
41. Id. at 415-22, 427-34.
42. Basic Doctrine, supra note 32; AicEAN DocTmNE, supra note 32, at 403-10; REvi-
vA.L, supra note 32, at 88-95, 99-103.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
pose laws even on the Deity, '4 3 is an example of the unaccepted
mode of natural rights thinking.4' Yet, it was Johnson himself who
cast the deciding vote in Ogden, spelling an end to the period of
contract clause expansion. Similarly, the Court in Terret v. Taylor,
a case later conceived as having been decided under the contract
clause, proceeded without any textual rationale at all.46 Finally,
many of the theorists whose work contributed significantly to the
rise of substantive due process professed to eschew natural rights
theories of judicial review in favor of a theory which permitted
only the "interpretation" of constitutional restrictions. 46 In gen-
eral, therefore, Ely's version of constitutional positivism is so
broad that it does not tell us very much about the ways the out-
comes of the cases might be related to prevailing beliefs about the
nature of law.
Recognizing the difficulties in connecting the outcomes of the
cases with prevailing conceptions of law, a second group of modern
scholars has sought explanations in judicial commitments to com-
peting modes of legal reasoning. Using the concepts of a formal
versus an instrumental style of legal reasoning, Professors Horwitz
and Nelson have begun to reexamine changes in the substantive
law from the point of view of their relationship to the prevailing
styles.47 Employing the formal style, a judge conceives himself as
"declaring the law" by deducing particular rules from "first princi-
ples of morality" or from the true fixed principles which underlie
the prior precedents. 48 In contrast, a judge reasoning in the instru-
mental style conceives himself to be "making the law" according to
43. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810).
44. J.H. ELY, supra note 34, at 211.
45. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
46. See, e.g., T.M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES IN THE AMERICAN UNION (1868); C. TIEDMAN, A TREATISE
ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1886).
47. Works in this vein with which the author is familiar include M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); W.E. NELSON: AMERICANIZATION OF
THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830
(1975); The Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Jurisprudence]; The
Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth
Century America, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Antislavery
Jurisprudence].
48. M. HORWrrz, supra note 47, at 1, 30; Antislavery Jurisprudence, supra note 47, at
516, 548.
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an explicit consideration of the effects of legal rules upon social
life.49
Nelson and Horwitz conclude that the periods characterized
by the instrumental and formal styles correspond roughly to the
periods cited by Corwin, Haines, and Tribe, although both see
early nineteenth century judges exhibiting tendencies towards both
styles.50 They portray early nineteenth century opinions as distin-
guished by the emergence of an instrumental style which achieved
dominance at the end of the 1820s, only to begin a protracted pe-
riod of breakdown resulting in late nineteenth century formalism.51
Horwitz and Nelson link periods of active protection for individual
rights with the tendency of judges to engage in formalist reasoning
and periods of passive protection for individual rights with the ten-
dency to engage in instrumental reasoning. The underlying notion
seems to be that the formal style obscures the political element in
judicial review, and the judges' propensity to intervene in the po-
litical process can* be explained, in part, by the extent to which
they believe they can draw a plausible distinction between legal
and political reasoning.
Horwitz further suggests that early and late nineteenth cen-
tury formalism in the individual rights cases reflected an attempt
by judges to "freeze" certain legal rules against legislative
change-rules that operated to the benefit of the commercial clas-
ses.5 2 Nelson attributes early nineteenth century formalism to an
attempt to protect a substantive consensus about individual rights
from the political process. He envisions Marshall and others at-
tempting to "reduce the areas of consensus they observed to an
analytically rigorous category of rights subject to legal protec-
tion. '53 He has yet to attempt to account for the motivations be-
49. Id.
50. M. HoRwiTz, supra note 47, at 30, 256, 259-60; Antislavery Jurisprudence, supra
note 47, at 519; Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 47, at 955. Horwitz and Nelson
agree on the formalist cast of early contract clause cases. Horwitz argues that the formalism
of these opinions stands in stark contrast to the explicit policy orientation of the early com-
mon law cases. M. HoRwITz, supra note 47, at 255-56. Nelson argues that the early contract
clause cases exhibit an awareness of both styles, and that judges intervened only when they
thought the issue sufficiently "legal" to bear resolution by formalistic analysis. Instrumental
or policy concerns were left to the political branches. Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra
note 47, at 944-56.
51. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text
52. See M. HORwrrz, supra note 47, at 255, 259.
53. Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 47, at 936.
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hind late nineteenth century formalism, except to show its roots in
anti-slavery and scientific thought."
Insofar as Horwitz and Nelson argue that a correlation exists
between the prevailing styles and the outcomes in the constitu-
tional cases, the results of the research into formalism and instru-
mentalism seem to mirror those revealed by the inquiry into pre-
vailing conceptions of law. Early contract clause cases and later
substantive due process cases are traced to a formal style; the in-
tervening instrumentalist period corresponds to the Supreme
Court's halt to the expansion of the contract clause.
The same criticism which applied to attempts to relate the
outcomes of the cases to prevailing conceptions of law applies to
attempts to explain the developments as the result of prevailing
styles of legal reasoning. Formalism, in the early and late nine-
teenth century, worked first for, then against the kinds of rights
the Court protected under the contract clause. In the process of
deducing rights from "first principles of morality" or from the
"fixed principles underlying prior cases,"55 late nineteenth century
judges vastly restricted the import of the Marshall Court's contract
clause doctrines.
The attempts to correlate the outcomes of the individual
rights cases with beliefs about the nature of law or commitments to
styles of legal reasoning thus do not seem to get much beyond an
observed tendency of the judges to restrict the political process
during periods marked by the prevalence of natural rights thinking
or formal legal analysis. This broad tendency may have in fact re-
sulted from an increased faith in "reason" as a source of individual
rights which accompanied beliefs in natural law or formal analysis.
Nonetheless, this broad tendency leaves unexplained why the doc-
trines developed by the Marshall Court fell into disfavor in the
late nineteenth century.
The attempts to explain the patterns of outcomes observed in
the individual rights cases in the nineteenth century by referring
to prevailing styles of legal reasoning or conceptions of law share a
common problem. In order to attribute the cases to formalism, in-
strumentalism, positivism, or natural law, the historian must adopt
54. Nelson has not yet undertaken to demonstrate the "impact of reasoning style on
substantive results." Antislavery Jurisprudence, supra note 47, at 515 n.12.
55. M. HORWITZ, supra note 47, at 1, 30; Antislavery Jurisprudence, supra note 47, at
516, 548.
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the judges' perceptions of the implications of these beliefs. Even if
we acknowledge that periods of American law are distinguished by
the prevalence of these characteristic commitments, the evidence
from the nineteenth century suggests that there were no necessary
implications of beliefs in either conception of law or style of legal
reasoning specific enough to account for the cases. Although the
normative theorist who seeks to prove that a style of legal reason-
ing or a conception of law is always the best approach must argue
for some necessary implications of one approach or the other, the
evidence available to us about changes in the character of individ-
ual rights against the state in the nineteenth century indicates that
there were no such constants throughout the century.
The critique developed above also has implications for the va-
rious interest analyses that have typically accompanied intellectual
explanations of the trends in the individual rights cases. The ear-
lier theorists emphasized the Court's protection of "private prop-
erty" against legislative majorities. Haines and Wright argued in
this vein.56 For Wright, the early Court made the "contract clause
a mighty instrument for the protection of the rights of property"5
and the later Court made the due process clause a haven for "ex-
treme laissez-faire philosophy." '58 For Haines, "[t]he two leading
events which weakened the government and correspondingly ex-
panded the rights and immunities of property holders were the
Dartmouth College case and the adoption of the 'due process
clause' of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868."
' 59
Despite the evidence of constant concern on the part of nine-
teenth century judges for the institution of private property, it is
clear that this concern was manifested in different ways in the
early and late parts of the century. The desire to protect "private
property" is too broad to provide an explanation for the cases. It
leaves unanswered the question of why the later Court felt it nec-
essary to undermine the doctrines that the Marshall Court suppos-
edly created for the same purpose. Thus, the notion that individual
rights cases throughout the century can be explained by the desire
to protect private property fails to account for the apparently dif-
ferent conceptions in each period about the constitutional restric-
56. See also R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERIcAN SUPREME COURT 71-77, 127-35 (1960).
57. B.F. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 28.
58. B.F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AmERmCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 254-55 (1967).
59. ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 32, at 418.
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tions thought to be legitimately derived from a regime of private
property.
A similar problem arises with attempts to explain the cases as
reflecting the "requirements of economic growth" or the "needs of
an expanding capitalist economy. '60 Indeed, recent explanations of
this type have seemed to abandon the notion that there were ob-
jective requirements or needs of the economy which governed the
outcomes of the cases. Instead, emphasis has been placed upon
changing conceptions of what those needs or requirements were.
The crucial insight, for example, of Horwitz's Transformation of
American Law is that precisely because there were no such objec-
tive requirements, one can observe how the adoption of one alter-
native path to economic growth involved the sacrifice of the inter-
ests of some groups in society to those of others.61 Similarly,
although McGurdy intimates that late nineteenth century legal
doctrine adjusted to the "needs of an ever expanding capitalist
economy," he seems to argue that these needs were not objective in
any sense."2 Instead, he concludes that the doctrine was indicative
of the "ideological commitments of post-war Americans." 3 Indeed,
it would be difficult to argue that the late nineteenth century
Court, which rejected demands for constitutional protection of tax
exemptions, land grants, compensation for safety improvements,
and the right to consolidate and combine, somehow knew the
"needs of capitalism" better than the capitalists themselves. 4
An explanation for the individual rights cases decided by the
nineteenth century Supreme Court, then, should attempt to ac-
count for the diminished protection for the kinds of rights typi-
60. An example of an analysis of this type, although in the context of the development
of common law rules in the nineteenth century, can be found in Posner, A Theory of Negli-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29 (1972).
61. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 47, at xv, 99-101.
62. McGurdy, supra note 2, at 988, 1005.
63. Id.
64. The tendency, at least in the writings of some modern Marxist theorists, has been
to argue that law serves capitalism only to the extent that it does not respond instrumen-
tally to the needs of identifiable actors in the capitalist economy. See, e.g., Balbus, Com-
modity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative Autonomy of the Law, 11 LAW &
Soc'Y 571 (1977). Balbus argues that the only necessary link between legal development and
capitalism is the maintainence of a legal system itself. If Balbus is correct, then it is obvi-
ously futile to analyze the substantive law for the ways in which it impeded or promoted
capitalism. In Balbus' account, the outcomes of all the cases, insofar as they were outcomes
of a legal system, promoted capitalism. Id.
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cally protected under the contract clause while accounting for the
growth of substantive due process. Nothing in the analysis devel-
oped above questions the attempt to examine in greater detail the
identity of groups which perceived changes in the substantive law
to be in their interest and sought to obtain judicial support for
those interests. Nonetheless, even those currently writing legal his-
tory in this mode suggest that it is necessary to seek some kind of
intellectual explanation for the outcomes of the cases. Horwitz and
Thompson, for instance, argue that it is not always possible, and
indeed sometimes wrong, to explain changes in legal doctrine by
inferring judicial motivation to favor the groups whose interests, in
retrospect, were promoted by the substantive law.65 Even if judges
think explicitly about the social effects of their decisions, it is ac-
knowledged that they often perceive the interests implicated by
various legal rules through a "filter" which separates "legitimate"
from "illegitimate' interests according to some set of ideas which
reflects their perceived duty to uphold a "rule of law." 6 Such an
acknowledgment is of course not inimical to interest analysis; it
merely posits the existence of at least one group in society (the
legal elite) and perhaps others which perceived the maintenance of
the idea of the "rule of law" as being in their interest.6 1
The method used in this Article to explain developments
under the contract clause will attempt a reconstruction of the
shifting conception of constitutionally protected-individual rights
which accompanied the rise of the contract clause and its eventual
65. Horwitz notes that much of the redistribution of wealth that accompanied the
transformation of private law rules in the nineteenth century may well have been "inadver-
tent." M. HoRwrrz, supra note 37, at 256. Thompson notes that even if law is viewed as an
ideological mask for class power, it can not fulfill that role without being at least partially
independent of class manipulation.
The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideol-
ogy, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall
seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and
criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being just.
E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNTERs: THE ORIGINS oF THE BLACK AcT 263 (1975).
66. The efforts to explain the outcomes of the cases as in part the result of commit-
ments to styles of legal reasoning and conceptions of law seem to be attempts to discover
the filters through which the judges sorted out the demands of the litigants. The criticism of
these arguments is not an attempt to undermine the idea that such filters exist; it is in-
tended as a prelude to developing a more accurate picture of the ways in which ideas influ-
enced the judges' formulation of the substantive law.
67. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 47, at xiii.
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demise in the face of the doctrine of substantive due process08 The
attempt will require the reconstruction of the actual doctrinal cate-
gories used by the Court to decide cases involving individual rights
against the state in the nineteenth century. The premise is that by
analyzing the categories used by the Court to legitimate federal ju-
dicial protection for rights against the state, one can in part ex-
plain why the Court decided the cases the way it did, even if better
links between the actual outcomes and the interests of various
groups are discovered at a later point.
C. An Alternative Approach
This account for the trends in the contract clause cases will
draw upon the concepts of vested and substantive rights as they
were developed by legal thinkers in the nineteenth century. Al-
though both concepts remain part of modern legal discourse, it has
been rare, until perhaps very recently, for the outcome of a consti-
tutional case to depend upon whether an individual right was
"vested." 9 The theory of vesting has been confined almost entirely
to the interpretation of rules (such as the rule against perpetuities)
acknowledged to be the product of an arcane and bygone era, but
necessary due to decades of reliance. Similarly, although the notion
of substantive rights does have constitutional importance today, it
is almost always discussed in opposition to procedural and not
vested rights.
Modern uses of the concepts of substantive and vested rights
distort the significance they had when they were opposed to each
other in nineteenth century legal thought. The basic distinction
between a vested and substantive right against the state was per-
ceived as that between a right which one had by virtue of a stand-
ing legal rule recognized by the legislature and a right which one
had independent of previously defined legal rules.
The legislative "recognition" of a standing legal rule necessary
for the right to vest was a complex notion evidenced either by a
previously enacted statute or by inaction in light of an established
common law rule. Under the regime of vested rights against the
68. The method employed herein owes much to Kennedy, The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 ButrALo L. REV. 209, 209-21, 362 n.59 (1979).
69. The theory underlying the Court's recent resurrection of the contract clause is en-
tirely unclear. See, e.g., Note, A Process-Orientated Approach to the Contract Clause, 89
YALE L.J. 1623, 1624-25 (1980).
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state, therefore, the definition of legal rights in the first instance
was an acknowledged political, hence ultimately legislative, func-
tion. Rights restricting the legislature's power accrued only when
an individual acted under the standing law. Thus every violation of
a vested right was conceived to result from the retrospective appli-
cation of a rule which did not exist at the time the individual's
right had vested.70 In contrast, under the regime of substantive
rights against the state, the content of the rules which the legisla-
ture could enact was openly restricted. It was the substance of the
rule simpliciter (its "unreasonableness") which offended the right
and not the manner in which it was applied (to actions performed
prior to the enactment of the offending statute). 1
Although there is nothing new in identifying the importance of
the doctrines of vested rights and substantive due process, their
significance in early and late nineteenth century legal thought has
tended to be overlooked in the attempt to analyze them as surro-
gates for ideas which are more readily accessible to modern legal
thought. For example, although noting that Ogden prevented the
interpretation of the contract clause to protect "liberty of con-
tract" as later conceived under the due process clause, Wright
nonetheless concluded that the transition from the contract clause
to substantive due process reflected an "incident in the continuous
development" of the "protection of vested rights in a democ-
racy. ' 72 Employing the modern perspective, Wright sees the con-
cept of vested rights as interchangeable with substantive due pro-
cess-a perspective itself an artifact of the disillusionment with
the boundaries of judicial review established by the concept of
vested rights. Wright therefore employs the term vested rights to
signify any property interests and suggests that the cases can be
explained in terms of the degree of protection provided for private
property. This sort of account ignores important changes in legal
thought that affected the plausibility of various outcomes in the
early and late nineteenth century.
The focus on the changing conception of individual contract
70. All laws conceived as retrospective, however, were not understood to divest vested
rights. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
71. From the nineteenth century perspective, then, the typical modem constitutional
right, e.g., the right to free speech, is substantive in the same sense as was liberty of
contract.
72. B.F. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 243, 258-59.
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and property rights as vested or substantive offers an alternative
account of the ideas shaping the history of contract clause juris-
prudence. These ideas concern a changing conception of the legiti-
macy of judicial review of individual rights which is not captured
in the histories which focus on changing judicial beliefs in natural
law, positivism, formalism or instrumentalism. The concepts of
vested and substantive rights reflected the characteristic mode of
rationalizing judicial protection of individual rights as the mainte-
nance of determinate boundary doctrines which distinguished be-
tween legitimate judicial enforcement of individual rights and the
illegitimate usurpation of a legislative function. In this sense, typi-
cal early and late nineteenth century judges who could be classified
as practitioners of either a formal or instrumental style of legal
reasoning or as believers in either a natural or positive jurispru-
dence shared less with each other than with their contemporary
counterparts when deriving the implications of either style or the-
ory for federal judicial protection of rights against the state. What
was shared in each era was a conceptual structure used to "solve"
the problem of the judicial role in individual rights cases, the most
prominent feature of these cases being alternatively, the concepts
of vested and substantive rights.
Moreover, it appears that this shared sense of the justiciability
of vested or substantive rights mediated between the opposed
modes of reasoning politically about conflicts between state power
and individual rights embodied in natural law theory, positivism,
formalism, and instrumentalism. The historical importance of
vested and substantive rights lies in their enabling judges to be-
lieve that they were enforcing individual rights without con-
fronting the contradictions of political and moral theory that
would have destroyed their sense of enforcing legal rights against
the state. The modern sense of the inevitability of "balancing,"
and hence of judicial legislation, is a direct descendant of the pro-
cess by which these concepts were revealed to reproduce the con-
tradictions that they were once thought to ameliorate.
This Article describes the process by which the legal elite
came to view as incoherent the boundary doctrines used to reason
about when a right had vested and offers this description as an
explanation for why the shift from vested to substantive rights oc-
curred. Although the focus will be on the internal evolution of legal
thought about rights against the state, the argument is not meant
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to disconnect this development from the changing character of
American social life or the triumph of particular economic or social
interests. At least part of that story, however, is embedded in the
development and destruction of the categories of legal thought
which reflected the legal elite's understanding of its role in contrib-
uting to the character of American social life through judicial re-
view of individual rights in the early and late nineteenth centuries.
A description of the history of the displacement of the vested
right by the substantive right in constitutional analysis cannot ac-
count for the outcomes of particular cases except in the long run.
The constant presence of disagreements about how to apply a
shared analysis precludes more precise explanation. More impor-
tantly, however, the history of these concepts in legal thought is
the history of the gradual recognition of the incoherence of these
notions-the gradual realization that the concepts failed to medi-
ate between opposing claims in a way that made it possible to be-
lieve that judicial protection of individual rights was law and not
politics. It is therefore impossible to attribute the outcome of any
but a very few cases to either the concepts of vested or substantive
rights, other than by noting the different styles of review charac-
teristic of each era. Nonetheless, this does not vitiate the observa-
tion that the constitutional arguments of the early and late nine-
teenth century were about whether a party had a vested or
substantive right against the state, and that the examination of the
development and demise of these concepts can explain how
changes in legal thought impacted on results over the long run.
In particular, the transformation from vested to substantive
rights offers an explanation of the decisions undermining the re-
strictions previously enforced under the contract clause which
parallelled the rise of substantive due process. While protecting in-
dividual contract and property rights throughout the nineteenth
century, the Court alternatively conceived its role through the legal
concepts of vested and substantive rights. As the framework for
legitimating the judicial role based on the latter conception
achieved dominance, many judges viewed even the most important
contract clause doctrines as misconceived. To the extent that those
doctrines made sense only as protections for vested rights, they ap-
peared to judges with a different conception of their role as either
arbitrary or in need of an alternative rationale. For example, to
judges for whom the issue of economic regulation had become a
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question of the substantive limitations on the exercise of the police
power required to protect substantive rights, an inquiry into the
vested rights of corporations under their charters seemed, at best,
a separate form of protection for a distinct and subordinate reli-
ance interest or, at worst, a grievous example of the Court engaging
in corporate favoritism.73
Before proceeding further, it seems necessary to confront the
persistent nominalist critique one encounters when one proposes to
use doctrinal categories to help explain the outcomes of cases. An
underlying theme in legal historiography, at least since the advent
of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism, seems to be that it
is impossible to use legal doctrine to explain the outcomes of cases
because the categories it contains exist "only" as creations of the
judges' minds.74 The decision of a judge can never be said to "fol-
low from" the categories; under the veneer of doctrine, the judge
was actually deciding a policy question involving a choice between
competing values.75 Doctrinal categories are thus meaningful to the
historian only to the extent that they serve as surrogates for what
are viewed as more fundamental ideas (i.e., about the nature of law
or legal reasoning) or social interests. Beyond their relationship to
more basic attitudes or beliefs, doctrinal categories can be safely
ignored.
One of the salutary effects of the critique of legal concepts was
the end of legal history which simply portrayed judges as deciding
cases correctly or incorrectly under the law. Nonetheless, it seems
73. Late nineteenth century judges responsible for the most limited reading of the po-
lice power when opposed to a substantive right were also often responsible for its broadest
reading when opposed to a vested right. On Justice Field, see McGurdy, supra note 2, at
983. Justice Pitney serves as a similar early twentieth century example. Compare his opin-
ions in Chicago Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915).
74. For an example of extreme nominalism in American legal thinking, see Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). On
the nominalism of the American legal realists, see Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U.
PA. L. REV. 429, 443 (1934).
75. For an example of this approach to legal reasoning by an American legal historian,
see L. FRIEmAN, A HISTORy OF AMERMAN LAW (1973).
This book treats American law, then, not as a kingdom unto itself, not as a set of
rules and concepts, not as the province of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of soci-
ety. It takes nothing as historical accident, nothing as autonomous, everything as
relative and molded by economy and society. This is the theme of every chapter
and verse.
Id. at 10.
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entirely possible to inquire into the ways in which the actual doc-
trinal categories employed by judges to demonstrate the legitimacy
of the outcomes actually influenced the outcomes, at least in the
long run. To argue that the judges were influenced by the prevail-
ing categories does not reproduce the formalist error. Saying that
part of an explanation for why a judge thought a particular deci-
sion consistent with the law can be found in the doctrinal catego-
ries he used to justify the decision is not the same thing as saying
that the decision necessarily "followed from" an analysis of "the
law."
The use of the formal rationale employed by the Court as at
least a partial explanation for the outcomes of the cases rests upon
two observations. First, despite the malleability of legal concepts,
their creation, criticism, alteration, and eventual destruction is a
process of social persuasion involving the joint activity of judges,
lawyers and commentators whose ordinary discourse does not pro-
ceed on the premise that legal categories are infinitely manipulable
or are mere surrogates for other, more fundamental, ideas or inter-
ests. Second, the process of doctrinal creation and disintegration
occurs through time and is therefore structured by the categories
inherited from the past. It is a common experience for even Su-
preme Court Justices to feel bound, and part of this feeling of
"boundness" seems attributable to the inherited ways of catego-
rizing the incredibly broad range of social phenomena which judges
are called upon to imbue with legal significance. 6 Of course, judges
are never wholly bound; categories are criticized, refined, and dis-
carded. Also, social events do not appear labelled as exercises of
the police power or as interferences with freedom of contract.
Judges obviously exercise choice in placing events within one or
another of the categories. The acknowledgment of the role of
choice in creating and employing the categories, however, does not
undermine the insight that what was experienced by the judges as
constraints on their behavior, imposed by their duty to decide
under the law, was reflected in the "settled law" of the age- the
set of categories, rules and tests which appeared to the legal elite
to order social phenomena in a way that "made sense."
Despite the ultimately contingent nature of the categories,
they do have a determinate history which provides a way to dis-
76. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICAL PROCESS 102-03 (1921).
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cover the structure of possibilities available to judges in deciding
the individual rights cases at different moments in the nineteenth
century. Of course, reconstructing the legal categories used to de-
cide the cases will never explain exactly why a case was decided
the way it was; the malleability of the categories themselves and
the process by which events were placed within them means that
the Court was always free to decide other than it did. Yet, in look-
ing at the ways in which the nineteenth century legal elite devel-
oped different categories for structuring individual rights cases
before the Supreme Court over the course of the century, one can
discern changes that account for the development and demise of
contract clause doctrine and the growth of substantive due process
without encountering the kinds of problems one confronts when
attempting to analyze these trends as outgrowths from beliefs in
formalism, instrumentalism, natural rights, or positivism. Changes
in conceptions of law or in styles of legal reasoning are ultimately
changes in ways of thinking about the categories (their origin or
the nature of their interrelatedness); changes in the characteristic
doctrines reflect changes in the categories themselves. What fol-
lows will be an explanation for the trends in contract clause and
due process clause cases that will draw upon the notion of a chang-
ing "legal consciousness" reflected in the doctrinal categories de-
veloped to analyze cases under the two clauses.
II. ANTEBELLUM RIGHTS AGAINST THE STATE
A. The Decision for Vested Rights
The antebellum Court's conception of the federal judicial role
in enforcing rights against the state was dictated by its decision to
protect only what were conceived of as vested rights against the
state and its rejection of the protection of substantive rights as
"too political" for judicial determination. This section traces that
decision through the early contract clause cases and discusses how
this perspective differs from previous explanations of antebellum
legal thought.
The contract clause cases preceding Ogden v. Saunders"7
posed the question of whether federal judicial review could legiti-
mately enforce vested or substantive rights. This question emerged
77. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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as the central issue in Ogden only after Chief Justice Marshall
made explicit his attempt to define the judicial role to comprise
the protection of substantive rights. 8 The Court's rejection of
Marshall's attempt to interpret the contract clause to protect
against infringements upon subsequent contracts (the right to con-
tract) brought to the surface an assumption about the illegitimacy
of enforcing substantive rights against the state that had been im-
plicit in the earlier cases: the parameters of the concept of vested
rights defined the parameters of individual rights issues amenable
to purely legal solutions.79 Although Marshall's defeat occasioned
the only overt statement of this assumption, judicial review of in-
dividual rights reflected the decision to protect only vested rights
until well after the Civil War.
In Fletcher v. Peck,80 the first case in which the full Supreme
Court applied the contract clause, the Court invalidated a Georgia
statute repealing a previous land grant. In his opinion for the
Court, Marshall reasoned that since the right infringed by the re-
pealing act had vested, it was beyond the power of the legislature
to "divest":
The principle asserted is, that one legislature is competent to repeal any act
which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one legislature
cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature. The correctness of this
principle, so far as respects general legislation can never be controverted.
But, if an act be done under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it.
The past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power. Conveyances have
been made, those conveyances have vested legal estates, and, if those estates
may be seized by the sovereign authority, still, that they originally vested is a
fact, and cannot cease to be a fact. When, then, a law is in its nature a con-
tract, when absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of the
law cannot devest those rights .... 81
In a concurring opinion, Justice Johnson advanced a similar argu-
ment. Noting that a ruling contrary to the Court's could have been
supported "only. . .upon the ground that no existing legislature
can abridge the powers of those which will succeed it," Johnson
also gave this principle only a qualified endorsement:
To a certain extent this is certainly correct; but the distinction lies between
power and interest, the right of jurisdiction and the right of soil. The right of,
78. Id. at 353-54.
79. Id. at 285.
80. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
81. Id. at 135.
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jurisdiction is essentially connected to, or rather identified with, the national
sovereignty. To part with it is to commit a species of political suicide.. . But
it is not so with the interests or property of a nation.. . When the legisla-
ture have once conveyed their interest or property in any subject to the indi-
vidual, they have lost all control over it; have nothing to act upon; it has
passed from them; is vested in the individual; becomes intimately blended
with his existence, as essentially so as the blood that circulates through his
system.
8 2
The best picture we have of the legal elite's understanding of
the concept of vested rights reflected in Fletcher comes down to us
through Thomas Cooley's Treatise on the Constitutional Limita-
tions Which Rest on the States of the American Union and Theo-
dore Sedgwick's Treatise on Statutory and Constitutional Con-
struction.8 3 Summarizing the antebellum legal wisdom, both
argued for a unified judicial role in the protection of individual
rights against the state whether they were discussing express pro-
tections for individual rights, such as the contract clause or the
states' due process and law of the land clauses, or the implications
for the protection of individual rights that could legitimately be
derived from the "nature of republican government. 8 4 Their
presentations of the distinguishing features of that role revealed
their understanding of the common character of the choices en-
tailed by the protection of vested rights.
Central to both Sedgwick's and Cooley's expositions was their
argument that the entire corpus of decisions defining vested rights
reflected the exercise of a form of legal reason that was particularly
appropriate to the judicial function. The idea was that the defini-
tion of vested rights entailed a class of choices about the applica-
tion of legal rules, as opposed to their substance, that fell within
the undisputed province of legal reasoning. The analogy was to
maxims governing statutory interpretation, or occasions upon
which equity would mitigate the technicality of the common law,
and not to substantive common law rulemaking power over which
the legislature had ultimate authority. Their conclusion, therefore,
was that the concept of vested rights defined the legitimate bound-
82. Id. at 143.
83. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at chs. V, IX & XI; T. SEnoWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, ch. V (1857). Page citations to SEDGWICK are to the 2d edition, edited by J.
Pomeroy, 1874. All references are to the text which was left unaltered by Pomeroy.
84. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 174-75; T. SEDGWICK, supra note 83, at 151-52.
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ary of both judicial enforcement of, and legislative interference
with, individual rights.8 5
Cooley, for example, presented the protection of vested rights
as a constitutionalized version of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel:
The chief restriction is that vested rights must not be disturbed; but in its
application as a shield of protection, the term "vested rights" is not used in
any narrow or technical sense, as importing a power of legal control merely,
but rather as implying a vested interest which it is equitable the government
should recognize, and of which the individual cannot be deprived without
injustice.8 6
Marshall had employed a similar sort of reasoning inFletcher v.
Peck:
Their case is not distinguishable from the ordinary case of purchasers of a
legal estate without knowledge of any secret fraud which might have led to
the emanation of the original grant. According to the well known course of
equity, their rights could not be affected by such fraud. Their situation was
the same, their title the same, with that of every other member of the com-
munity who holds land by regular conveyances from the original patentee.
... A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of
the grantor, and implies a contract not to reassert that right. A party is,
therefore, always estopped by his own grant.87
Prominent, of course, among the principles guiding the equita-
ble application of existing legal rules so as to protect individual
rights was that militating against the retroactive application of
statutes, although there was disagreement about the kinds of cases
in which a party against whom a statute was applied retroactively
had been divested of a vested right. Sedgwick came close to argu-
ing that the protection of vested rights required invalidating all
retrospective statutes when he rejected certain doctrines formu-
lated by the courts to determine whether a retrospective statute
acted upon a vested right:
In regard to this matter of remedies, it has been in several cases held, that
the right of the Legislature to interfere depended on the point whether the
end sought to be attained by the Legislature was a good one. So, an act cut-
ting off the defense of usury was held valid, because usury was considered an
85. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at chs. V, IX & XI; T. SFnoWICK, supra note 83, at ch.
86. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 357-58.
87. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135, 137.
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immoral defense. So, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has said there
could be no vested right to do wrong. So, the act confirming invalid marriages
was held to be good, because the object aimed at by the Legislature was com-
mendable. But this is a formidable if not a fallacious line of reasoning. It
assumes that a power exists in the judiciary to decide on the morality, wis-
dom, or justice of acts of legislation, and to treat them accordingly.8
Nonetheless, Sedgwick admitted:
There is, indeed, a large number of cases in which appeals are made for legis-
lative relief or assistance, in which it would be very injurious to assert the
doctrine that the Legislature is incompetent to pass laws having a retroactive
effect. ... In these, and many other cases, it is difficult to avoid giving the
acts of the Legislature a retroactive effect; and every such effect must or may
influence injuriously some individual case. But the interests of the commu-
nity are paramount."'
Cooley demonstrated greater faith in the Court's equitable judg-
ment: "There are numerous cases which hold that retrospective
laws are not obnoxious to constitutional objection, while in others
they have been held to be void. The different decisions have been
based upon facts making the different rulings applicable."90 A con-
troversial example of this sort of judgment follows:
Other cases.. . hold that, although [a] deed was originally ineffectual for the
purpose of conveying the title, [a] healing statute may accomplish the intent
of the parties by giving it effect. At first sight these cases might seem to go
beyond the mere confirmation of a contract, and to be at least technically
objectionable, as depriving a party of property without due process of law;
since they proceeded upon the assumption that the title still remained in the
grantor, and that the healing act was required for the purpose of divesting
him of it, and passing it over to the grantee. There is some apparent force,
therefore, in the objection that such a statute deprives a party of vested
rights. But the objection is more specious than sound. If all that is wanting to
a valid contract or conveyance is the observance of some legal formality, the
party may have a legal right to avoid it; but the right is coupled with no
equity, even though the case be such that no remedy could be afforded the
other party in the courts. The right which the healing act takes away in such
a case is the right in the party to avoid his contract- a naked legal right,
which it is usually unjust to insist upon, and which no constitutional provi-
sion was ever designed to protect.
The operation of these cases, however, must be carefully confined to the
parties to the original contract, and to such other persons who occupy the
88. T. SEDGWIcK, supra note 83, at 660-61.
89. Id. at 170.
90. T.M. CooLEY, supra note 46, at 370.
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same position with no greater equities. Subsequent bona fide purchasers can-
not be divested of the property they have acquired, by a retrospective act
changing the legal position of the grantor in regard to the thing pur-
chased.... The position of the case is altogether changed by this purchase.
The legal title is no longer separated from the equities. . . . Under such cir-
cumstances even the courts of equity must recognize the right of the second
purchaser as best, and it is secure against legislative interference."
Despite the disagreement about the exact point at which the exer-
cise of the Court's judgment about the equitable application of le-
gal rules to define vested rights devolved into review of the "wis-
dom" of the legislation itself, the message conveyed by Cooley and
Sedgwick was the same. The reasoning employed by the courts to
define vested rights was about the application of legal rules and
was therefore different in kind from the political choices embodied
in the formulation of the substantive legal rules themselves.
Classifying decisions about vested rights under the heading of
judgments about the application of legal rules served to analogize
the protection of vested rights to an aspect of the judicial func-
tion-doing equity within the framework of laws enacted by the
sovereign-the legitimacy of which had a heritage independent of
the institution of judicial review itself. For instance, frequent anal-
ogy was made between the maxims guiding equity practice in Eng-
land and the principles guiding the definition of vested rights, al-
though it was understood that the "republican" innovation was to
employ these principles as restrictions upon the subsequent exer-
cise of legislative power and not as "rules of construction only." 92
Where, for example, Cooley and Sedgwick disagreed on some of
the cases in which a retrospective statute divested a vested right,
they could agree that it was "a sound rule of construction to give a
statute a prospective operation only, unless its terms show a legis-
lative intent that it should have retrospective effect. '9 3
The belief in the "legal" nature of the mode of reasoning rep-
resented by the application of legal rules to protect individual
rights informed the way in which both Sedgwick and Cooley saw
judicial protection of individual rights as reconciled with legislative
power. Sedgwick defined legislative power as the "lawmaking
power" and judicial authority to void statutes divesting vested
91. Id. at 377-79 (citations omitted).
92. T. SEDGWICK, supra note 83, at 164.
93. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 370; id. at 173.
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rights as a consequence of its power to require that the legislature
"act through law."'' 4 While acknowledging that the exercise of this
power entailed difficult decisions about the "true nature of laws,"
Sedgwick understood those decisions to be different in kind from
the considerations of "substance" that would result if judges "ab-
rogate[d] an authority so vague and so dangerous as the power to
define and declare the doctrines of natural law and abstract
right."95 Similarly, Cooley defined legislative power as "legislative
sovereignty," and judicial authority to void statutes divesting
vested rights as a consequence of its power to limit the legislature
to the performance of "legislative functions.""5 While this formula-
tion also raised difficult questions about the nature of the legisla-
tive function, Cooley listed as his first fundamental rule: "The leg-
islative department is not made a special agency for the exercise of
specifically defined legislative power, but is entrusted with the gen-
eral authority to make laws at discretion."9  In either view, the
94. T. SEDGWICK, supra note 83, at 154.
95. Id. at 155-56, 159.
It is very plausible to say that the legislature ought not to be permitted to do
anything flagrantly unjust, as, to take the property of A and give it to B; to make
a man judge in his own case, or commit any other enormity. But in every case
there are disputed questions of fact as well as of principle; and the real point is
whether the Legislature shall decide on the nature of the public exigency and
the rights of its subjects, or whether the judiciary shall assume that power. It is
conceded that the power of the Legislature must be confined to "making laws."
But the very words of our State Constitutions which declare them the law-mak-
ing power exclude the judiciary from any share in it; and such share they will
undoubtedly have if they are at liberty to refuse to execute a statute, on the
ground that it conflicts with their notions of morality or justice.. . .[W]ho will
undertake to decide what are the principles of eternal justice? And who can pre-
tend to fix any limits to the judicial power, if they have the right to annul the
operations of the Legislature on the ground that they are repugnant to natural
right?
. T]he Legislature is to confine itself to its function of "making laws."
... The imperfection of language does not permit us to define with absolute
precision the meaning of the term "law," but each case must depend upon its
peculiar features.
... [I]t is the right and duty of the judiciary to repress and confine the legis-
lative body within the true limits of the law-making power, but that they have
no right whatever to set aside, to arrest, or nullify a law passed in relation to a
subject within the scope of legislative authority, on the ground that it conflicts
with their notions of natural right, abstract justice, or sound morality.
Id.
96. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 85-90.
97. Id. at 87.
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concept of vested rights legitimated judicial review of individual
rights by confining it to the manner in which legislative power was
exercised, and excluding review of the substantive exercise of the
"general authority to make laws at discretion. "98
The distinction thus drawn between legal reasoning about the
application of the standing law to protect individual rights, and
political judgment about the substance of legal rules helps explain
the framework in which the debate brought to fruition in Ogden
developed. The claims made by Marshall and Johnson in Fletcher
v. Peck, that the protection of vested rights was consistent with
the legislature's possessing the "most absolute power," the "right
of jurisdiction," or "sovereignty,"'' all make sense when viewed
against the backdrop of the concepts of vested rights and legisla-
tive sovereignty. Where the former was understood to encompass a
bounded form of legal reasoning about the application of legal
rules, the latter was understood as discretionary power over the
substance of legal rules themselves.
The test of the concept of vested rights arose in the bank-
ruptcy cases. In Sturges v. Crowninshield the Court, in an opinion
by Marshall, voided a New York bankruptcy statute under which a
debtor had been discharged from paying a debt incurred prior to
the enactment of the statute.100 The decision, therefore, could have
rested entirely on the theory that the legislation had divested a
right vested under the standing law by purporting to absolve the
debtor from a pre-existing debt. Although adopting this line of rea-
soning for the bulk of his published brief, the creditor's attorney
also argued that the invalidity of the statute did not depend on its
retrospective application:
Legislatures act within the limits of their powers, only when they establish
laws to enable parties to enforce contracts; laws to afford redress to the in-
jured against negligence and fraud in not performing engagements; and
Courts act within their proper sphere, when they confine themselves to the
exposition of those contracts, and giving efficacy to the laws.101
The suggestion that all bankruptcy statutes were unconstitutional,
as opposed to only those applied to discharge pre-existing debts,
implied that the Court could legitimately protect substantive
98. Id.
99. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 134-35.
100. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
101. Id. at 131-32.
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rights by reviewing directly the content of the contract rules en-
acted by the legislature.
In the Sturges opinion, Marshall avoided addressing the ques-
tion of whether the Court was voiding all bankruptcy laws or only
those which discharged pre-existing debts. Yet at one point in the
opinion he advanced an argument that appeared to accept the idea
that it was the substance of the bankruptcy act and not its retro-
spective application that was offensive. Noting that the distinction
between "the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the
legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at bar, and
exists in the nature of things," Marshall suggested that legislative
power to enact contract rules extended only to the provision of
remedies.1 0 2 Although admitting that remedies could "certainly be
modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct," Marshall im-
plied that the legislature's remedial discretion could not be exer-
cised to impair rights whose content could be determined by the
Court independently of the established contract regime.1 0 3
In M'Millan v. M'Neil, the case immediately following Sturges
in the reports, Marshall clarified his position by stating that the
result in Sturges had not depended upon the fact that the statute
in that case applied to pre-existing debts.0 This portion of the
opinion, however, was understood to be dicta about an as yet un-
settled question. Since the bankruptcy law invalidated in M'Millan
had been applied to discharge a debtor from paying a debt in-
curred in another state, it was recognized that the Court had not
faced squarely the issue of the constitutionality of prospective
bankruptcy laws where there was no doubt about the governing
law. In his Commentaries, James Kent noted that the statute in-
validated in M'Millan might have been unconstitutional in its ap-
plication to debts incurred outside the territorial limits of the state
and not because its application to debts incurred after its passage
impaired the obligation of contracts.1 5 It was therefore left to
Ogden v. Saunderse" for the Court to decide if it would conceive
itself as the guarantor of vested or substantive rights by deciding
on the legitimacy of its reviewing the content of the state's con-
102. Id. at 200.
103. Id.
104. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209, 212-13 (1819).
105. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 395 (1826).
106. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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tract rules when their application to subsequent contracts vitiated
any claim that they divested rights derived from the standing law.
In seriatim opinions, a four judge majority in Ogden held that
the contract clause prohibited only those bankruptcy laws which
purported to apply to antecedent debts.0 7 Marshall published a
dissent joined by Justices Story and Duvall, his only published dis-
sent in his thirty-five year tenure on the bench.108 The decision
answered, for the antebellum legal elite, the question of whether
there were any substantive rights against the state under the fed-
eral Constitution. It thereby brought to the surface an underlying
conception of the Court's legitimate function in enforcing individ-
ual rights and made clear the limitations on the Court's role under-
stood to follow from that conception.
Although Marshall's dissent is well known for his description
of the origin of the right to contract in the state of nature, he made
it clear that he understood the obligations protected by the con-
tract clause to be legal and not moral:
All admit, that the constitution refers to, and preserves, the legal, and not the
moral obligation of a contract. Obligations purely moral, are to be enforced
by the operation of internal and invisible agents, not by the agency of human
laws. The restraints imposed on States by the constitution, are intended for
those objects which would, if not restrained, be the subject of State legisla-
tion. What, then, was the original legal obligation of the contract now under
the consideration of the Court?""'
All, then, depended upon the law defining the "original legal obli-
gation of the contract" at the time it was created.110 On this ques-
tion, Marshall balked at arguing that it was the natural and not
the positive law which defined contractual obligations. Acknowl-
edging the constitutionality of prospectively applied usury laws
and the states' statutes of frauds, Marshall admitted the existence
of legislative power to prevent certain obligations from arising in
the first instance.1 The question, as noted by Justice Trimble,
was why, if the legislature had that power, could it not declare in a
prospective bankruptcy act that contracts would be given a "condi-
tional or qualified obligation which would cease on the happening
107. Id. at 256-57.
108. Id. at 332-56 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 337-38.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 348.
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of a future event?" '112
Marshall responded with two related arguments for why the
bankruptcy act could not be understood to have defined a condi-
tional obligation which was not impaired by the subsequent appli-
cation of the discharge. The first was perhaps his better known
argument that such an obligation was inconsistent with the "pre-
existing obligation to do that which one has promised on consider-
ation to do," which he derived from the natural right to con-
tract.113 The second was that the contract clause prohibited the
state legislatures from creating a conditional obligation of the kind
set forth in the act:
That law may have, on future contracts, all the effect which the counsel for
the plaintiff in error claim, will not be denied.
A law may determine the obligation of a contract on the happening of a
contingency, because it is the law. If it be not the law, it cannot have this
effect.
In our system, the legislature of a State is the supreme power, in all cases
where its action is not restrained by the constitution of the United States.
Where it is so restrained, the legislature ceases to be the supreme power, and
its acts are not law. It is, then, begging the question to say, that, because
contracts may be discharged by a law previously enacted, this contract may
be discharged by this act of the legislature of New York; for the question
returns upon us, is this act a law? Is it consistent with, or repugnant to, the
constitution of the United States? This question is to be solved only by the
constitution itself.1 4
Using either argument, Marshall did not succeed in convincing
the majority that his approach provided an intelligible legal stan-
dard for distinguishing the bankruptcy act from other prospective
regulations of the power to create a legally binding contract. More-
over, at the penultimate point in his opinion, Marshall did his best
to distinguish the bankruptcy act without judging the relative mer-
its of various prospective contract rules. Instead, he attempted to
show that the key factor was the time at which the act could be
said to operate upon the contract. If it had no effect on the original
legal obligation of the contract, then the statutory discharge subse-
quently applied could be conceived to divest an existing legal right:
The time to which the word "impairing" applies, is not the time of the pas-
sage of the act, but of its action on the contract. That is the time present in
112. Id. at 323.
113. Id. at 344 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 347-48.
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contemplation of the prohibition. The law, at its passage, has no effect
whatever on the contract. . . . When, then, does its operation commence?
We answer, when it is applied to the contract. Then, if ever, and not till then,
it acts on the contract, and becomes a law impairing its obligation.115
But Marshall's argument here avoided rather than answered Trim-
ble's question. If usury laws and the statute of frauds acted on con-
tracts at the moment of their passage, such that their subsequent
application impaired no legal obligation, why did the bankruptcy
act not have the same effect?
Whatever Marshall had in mind by arguing that the bank-
ruptcy act, unlike other prospective contract rules, had "no effect
whatever on the contract. . . at its passage," 116 it seems clear that
his approach failed to persuade where it suggested substantive lim-
itations on the power to regulate subsequent contracts. Justice
Trimble's opinion provides an illuminating contrast, since he too
argued that the "natural" obligation may sometimes be legally en-
forceable: "[I]f there be nothing in the municipal law to the con-
trary, the civil obligation being, by the very nature of government,
substituted for, and put in the place of, natural obligation, would
be co-extensive with it. 117 Trimble did not take issue with Mar-
shall's assertion as to the existence of a natural obligation; instead
he denied its direct enforceability where the legislature had previ-
ously defined an applicable legal rule. To the extent not delimited
by laws in place at the time the contract was made, Trimble would
also understand the obligation of the contract to correspond to the
parties' natural rights. The conflict was thus not about the mean-
ingfulness of thinking about the obligation of a contract as derived
from the natural law, but about the justiciability of the parties'
natural rights where the political sovereign had previously defined
a legal obligation different from that which would have been recog-
nized in the absence of applicable legislation.
Commentators attempting to reconstruct the ideas influential
in the cases through Ogden have sought to discover underlying ju-
dicial beliefs by researching the frequency of express endorsements
of the practice of appealing to constitutional principles indepen-
dent of the constitutional text. Despite the agreement between
Marshall and Johnson on the result in Fletcher and on its ration-
115. Id. at 337.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 320.
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ale under the concept of vested rights, their opinions are better
known for their partially conflicting statements on the source of
the Court's authority to enforce what were acknowledged as vested
rights. Marshall vacillated on whether the holding followed simply
from "the nature of society and of government" (thus applying
even if Georgia were "a single sovereign power") or as a conse-
quence of the national judicial review imposed by the contract
clause.""' Johnson eschewed any reliance on the contract clause
and rested his decision on "a general principle, on the reason and
nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on the
deity." '
To view these statements as endorsements of alternative
sources of constitutional values, indicative of conflicting jurispru-
dential assumptions, is to elevate the form over the substance of
the opinions. As is evident in Fletcher and Ogden, the background
principle of vested rights can be found to underlie equally the lim-
its to antebellum judicial interpretation of the contract clause and
the limits to judicial authority to invalidate statutes on the basis of
"general principles" of constitutional law.120
In contrast to the express endorsements of appealing to non-
textual sources in Fletcher, traditionally cited as evidence of natu-
ral law thinking, Ely draws attention to what he views as the "in-
terpretivist" approach manifested in Ogden by all the judges. 12 1
Nonetheless, this analysis appears also to seize on only one aspect
of the opinions. The majority justices in Ogden argued that in
reading the contract clause to apply only to antecedent debts, they
were construing it consistently with the concept of vested rights, a
principle whose legitimacy did not require express constitutional
authorization. 22 As in Fletcher, both textual and non-textual
sources were cited in what appears to have been understood as a
debate about judicial enforcement of vested or substantive rights.
It was Johnson who cast the deciding vote in Ogden, harkening
back to his support for the protection of vested rights as a princi-
118. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810).
119. Id. at 143.
120. What could be justified as a consequence of the federal contract clause or only on
general constitutional principles became dispositive only when the Court, after Ogden, un-
dertook to distinguish between its jurisdiction to protect individual rights in diversity and
federal question cases. See infra text accompanying notes 172-73.
121. J.H. ELY, supra note 34, at 209 n.41.
122. Ogden v. Saunders,.25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 347-48 (1827); see also id. at 295-96.
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ple understood not to depend upon any express constitutional au-
thorization. Justice Thompson expressed a similar view while join-
ing in the Court's rejection of substantive rights:
No State Court would, I presume, sanction and enforce an ex post facto law;
if no such prohibition was contained in the constitution of the United States;
so, neither would retrospective laws, taking away vested rights, be enforced.
Such laws are repugnant to those fundamental principles, upon which every
just system of laws is founded. It is an elementary principle adopted and
sanctioned by the Courts of justice in this country ... .12s
The inquiry into the frequency of express appeals to textual or
non-textual sources of individual rights therefore does not explain
the ideas influential in the development of contract clause juris-
prudence through Ogden. Other commentators have focused their
research on the actual holdings of the Court under the contract
clause as a second reflection of judicial assumptions. Tribe and
Isaacs, for example, have used the justices' positions in Ogden as
an indicator of whether they perceived the obligation of contracts
to be defined by the positive or natural law. Both argue that the
decision to invalidate only those bankruptcy laws applied to pre-
existing debts reflects the majority's "basic" postulate that "a con-
tract incorporates in its terms the positive law of the time and
place where it is made. ' 124 On this view, it is the Court's denial of
a natural right to contract that distinguishes its approach in Ogden
from that of the dissenters, whose view is taken to represent the
assumption evident in the earlier cases.
The attempt to so characterize the beliefs of the judges falters
most obviously in the case of Justice Johnson. His opinion includes
a disquisition on the origin of the right to contract in the state of
nature as explicit and eloquent as that which appears in the Mar-
shall opinion.125 In addition, Justice Washington acknowledged
that the universal law "creates the obligation of a contract made
upon a desert spot, where no municipal law exists": even where the
municipal law existed, the universal law could be understood to
create "part" of the obligation of contracts. 26 This position was
similar to Justice Trimble's belief that the natural law controlled
123. Id. at 303-04.
124. L. TRME, supra note 33, at 467-68.
125. Compare Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 282-92 (1827) with id. at
345-57.
126. Id. at 258-59.
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interpretation of the obligation of contracts where the legislature
had not exercised its power to regulate subsequent contracts
through control over the content of prospective legal rules. More-
over, the argument that contracts incorporate the law of the time
and place where they were made was mustered in the majority
opinions to support, by analogy to conflicts of law rules, legislative
power over the content of contract rules, not to deny the natural
right to contract. 127
Thus, the understanding of the right to contract as derived
from the natural law was not perceived as inconsistent with the
belief that the Court could invalidate only those statutes which
divested a right vested under the standing law. The majority jus-
tices, for instance, expressed the belief that in defining contract
rights vested under the standing law, their task was to enforce the
"intentions of the parties" insofar as they were not inconsistent
with the legislature's discretionary power over the substance of
contract rules.128 In addition, the majority justices expressed seri-
ous doubt as to whether all legislative rules pertaining to contracts
could be said to have been incorporated into agreements made
during their "tenure." Distinguishing between contract rights and
remedies, they noted without expressly deciding that the parties
might not be legitimately "deemed" to have contracted with refer-
ence to the states' remedial regime.1 29 Thus, while acknowledging
legislative power over the creation of prospective contract rules,
the majority also understood the judicial role in defining vested
contract rights as informed by the natural right of the parties to
"impose [a law] upon themselves. 1 30
Even Tribe recognizes that in view of the additional doctrinal
tests used by the Court to determine when a right had vested, the
concession to positivism represented by Ogden can be understood
as only partial. Discussing the distinction between contract rights
(held to vest) and contract remedies (held not to vest), Tribe con-
cludes that continuing natural law thinking can be discerned in the
Court's decision to protect not all legal rights defined by the stand-
ing law, but rather only those upon which it felt individuals were
127. Id. at 259, 298-300. The references were to the conflicts principle holding that con-
tracts were governed by jure loci contractus.
128. Id. at 256-57.
129. Id. at 300-02; see also id. at 284-85.
130. Id. at 298.
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entitled to rely. 131 Corwin made a similar judgment about the nat-
ural law basis of such doctrines as "there is no vested right to do
wrong," although he portrayed these doctrines as evidence of the
continuity of antebellum natural law assumptions. 13 2
The characterization of the contract clause holdings as reflec-
tive of either a positivist or natural law jurisprudence therefore ap-
pears as inconclusive as the research which focuses upon the rela-
tive frequency of express endorsements of textual or non-textual
modes of constitutional interpretation. Although the decision not
to extend constitutional protection to substantive rights was per-
ceived to confine judicial review to rights derived from existing le-
gal rules, it is also true that the actual decisions about which rights
defined by the standing law "vested" reflected judicial choice
about the interests which "it is equitable the government should
recognize, and of which the individual cannot be deprived without
injustice. '133 The interpretation of the rights created by the stand-
ing law reflected both the tradition which held that legal rules gov-
erned the distribution of legal rights and the tradition which held
that the interpretation of legal rights depended upon their relation
to natural justice and equity.1 34
The attempts to trace the decision for vested rights to either a
formal or instrumental style of legal reasoning encounter a similar
difficulty. Nelson, for example, appears to suggest that there is evi-
dence for the shift from formalism to instrumentalism in the con-
tract clause cases themselves."' Focusing on the cases until Ogden,
131. L. TRIE, supra note 34, at 467-69.
132. Basic Doctrine, supra note 32, at 260-61.
133. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 357-58.
134. As Cooley acknowledged, these judgments went beyond the "narrow" or "techni-
cal" question of who had a "power of legal control merely" under the standing law. Id. The
more general problem with this sort of analysis of the beliefs underlying the distinction
between rights and remedies and the other boundary doctrines formulated for determining
when a right defined by the standing law has vested is that it assumes that a "truly" positiv-
ist approach would have protected equally all entitlements defined by the existing legal
order. That approach would have disabled the legislature from exercising any rulemaking
power whatsoever, since an existing legal order defines a complete set of entitlements, some
of which are unavoidably changed by any legislative intervention. Such a result was obvi-
ously not contemplated by the antebellum legal elite, whether it viewed the protection of
vested rights as a consequence of the natural or positive law. This point is explored further
infra at text accompanying notes 188-89.
135. Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 47, at 955. In contrast, Horwitz rejects
the idea that the constitutional cases illustrate the transition from a formal to an instru-
mental style of reasoning which he finds in the common law cases. He contrasts the instru-
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he argues that Marshall's attempt in Fletcher and Dartmouth Col-
lege to delineate an "analytically rigorous category of rights subject
to legal protection" was evidence of the formal protection of indi-
vidual rights against the "incursion of political power."136 He then
asserts that the failure of Marshall's "traditional appeal to natural
rights" in Ogden reflected the breakdown of formalism in "[tihe
era of majoritarian democracy ushered in by Andrew Jackson's
presidency. '137
The problem with this analysis is that it fails to distinguish
between Marshall's use of the formal style in Ogden to argue for
the protection of substantive rights and his earlier use of that style
to protect rights vested under existing legal rules. Marshall's opin-
ion in Ogden was neither traditional nor precedented in view of the
analysis of the parties' vested rights employed by the Court in
Fletcher and Dartmouth College. Nelson's explanation therefore
fails to account for why the Court viewed Marshall's attempt to
protect substantive rights as an illegitimate departure from the ac-
cepted mode of reasoning about constitutionally protected individ-
ual rights. In addition, the consistency with which the Court and
the treatise writers relied upon the concept of vested rights to le-
gitimate the judicial role suggests that the boundary between law
and politics depended not on whether an issue was amenable to
solution by formal or instrumental reasoning, but rather upon
whether it raised a question about the existence of a vested right,
appropriate to "legal" reasoning about the individual rights de-
mental antebellum private law opinions with what he refers to as the "persistent formalism
of public law." M. HORwrrz, supra note 47, at 255-56. It is therefore not clear how, or
whether, he would attribute the development of federal protection of individual rights
against the state to the conflicting styles. At one point, he appears to link the persistent
formal style of the public law cases to the judges' retaining judicial control over potentially
redistributory statutory law, while employing instrumental reasoning in the private law
cases whose redistributive impact they controlled (to the benefit of mercantile and en-
trepreneurial groups). Id. at 256. Although Horwitz accomplishes the goal he set for him-
self-to correct the distortion in legal views of the nineteenth century which resulted from
"excessive equation of constitutional law with law" (id. at xii)-his discussion of the relation
between results and reasoning styles here comes perilously close to undermining his concep-
tion that the "legal consciousness in any particular period is not simply the' sum of those
contemporary social forces that impinge upon law." Id. at xiii. If the reasoning styles were
employed as more or less convenient forms for protecting certain social interests, then it is
not clear how these styles reflected an autonomy of the law to the "extent that ideas are
autonomous." Id.
136. Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 47, at 936.
137. Id. at 955.
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rived through the application of the standing law.
Sedgwick, in fact, discussed explicitly what might be charac-
terized as an instrumental conflict at the root of defining vested
rights:
Let us ... sum up the result of our researches, and state as accurately as we
can what direct interference with private rights and interests of property can
and cannot be accomplished by laws.
The difficulty of this subject fully equals its importance: on the one
hand, any interference with rights acquired under existing laws is a positive
evil and injury; while on the other, to deny to the Legislature power to make
such changes as the social or political condition requires, would reduce us to a
state of Chinese stagnation and immobility, and would be absurdly inconsis-
tent with the condition of our country and the character of our people. These
inherent difficulties have led to frequent contradiction; and there is perhaps
no subject of equal importance on which there are greater incongruities than
on the point, what rights are vested so as to be beyond the reach of legislative
action, and what are within its proper and regular control.138
In contrast, Cooley avoided any explicit discussion of conflict by
erecting the decisions into an edifice of formal categorical rules:
[A] mere expectation of property in the future is not a vested right.
[T]he right to a particular remedy is not a vested right.
[A] right to be governed by existing rules of evidence is not a vested
right.
[A] party has no vested right in a defence based upon an informality
not affecting his substantial interest.
A statutory privilege is not a vested right.39
Both Cooley and Sedgwick, however, agreed on the centrality of
the concept of vested rights to the proper judicial role in the pro-
tection of individual rights against the state.140
In context, therefore, the references in Ogden to the obligation
of contracts incorporating the positive law of their time and place
do not reflect a denial of the meaningfulness of natural law, but
rather a reaffirmation of the idea, central to Fletcher v. Peck,1 4 of
the justiciability of rights vested under the standing law. Insofar as
vested contract rights appeared to reflect both the natural right to
contract and the rights derived from the operation of legal rules
enacted by the political sovereign, their support drew upon argu-
138. T. SEDGWICK, supra note 83, at 649-50.
139. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at ch. XI.
140. Id. at chs. V, IX & XI; T. SEDWICK, supra note 83, at ch. V.
141. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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ments derived from both jurisprudential "schools." Justice John-
son saw both approaches incorporated in the concept of vested
rights:
Right and obligation are considered by all ethical writers as correlative terms:
Whatever I by my contract give another a right to require of me, I by that act
lay myself under an obligation to yield or bestow. The obligation of every
contract will then consist of that right or power over my will or actions, which
I, by my contract, confer on another. And that right and power will be found
to be measured neither by moral law alone, nor universal law alone, nor by
the laws of society alone, but by a combination of the three,-an operation in
which the moral law is explained and applied by the law of nature, and both
modified and adapted to the exigencies of society by positive law.",
The question was not which justices believed in a natural law foun-
dation for the law of contracts; it was the extent to which that
accepted foundation was thought to legitimate judicial review of
legislative contract rules-a question which the majority answered
by rejecting what it perceived as substantive review of the states'
prospective legal rules.
The acceptance of the notion that the natural law was realized
through the positive law by judicial enforcement of rights vested
under standing legal rules further illustrates the difficulty in por-
traying Ogden as the positivist counterpoint to the natural law as-
sumptions of the earlier cases. Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v.
Bull, which, for Corwin, most clearly reflected these early assump-
tions, in fact incorporates beliefs virtually identical to those in-
forming the majority's approach in Ogden.14 3 In the list of acts
Chase cited as violative of the "first great principles of the social
compact," he included the following:
A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for
an act, which when done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that de-
stroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a
man a judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A and gives
it to B .... [Tihe Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they
may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in
future cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong;
but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime;
or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of
142. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 281-82. This statement was adopted by
Story. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1372,
at 243-44 (1833).
143. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
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private property.1"
The reference to the legitimacy of protecting, through judicial re-
view, antecedent private contracts and the reference to legislative
power to create rules for future cases is consistent with what the
Court in Ogden understood to be the judicial role prescribed by
the concept of vested rights. In addition, when Chase discussed
"the right of private property" protected by the "very nature of
our free Republican governments," he understood it to be enforce-
able by judicial review through the protection of rights vested
under the standing law:
It seems to me, that the right of property, in its origin, could only arise from
compact express, or implied, and I think it the better opinion, that the right,
as well as the mode, or manner, of acquiring property, and of alienating or
transferring, inheriting, or transmitting it, is conferred by society; it is regu-
lated by civil institution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by pos-
itive law. When I say that a right is vested in a citizen, I mean, that he has
the power to do certain actions; or to possess certain things, according to the
law of the land.14 5
For Chase, therefore, as for the majority in Ogden, the understand-
ing of a natural right to contract and to own private property was
not perceived as inconsistent with the idea that these rights be-
came justiciable only when recognized in legal rules acknowledged
by the sovereign. The basic postulate of Ogden was not dissimilar
to that underlying the earlier cases: natural individual rights to
contract and to own private property could be legitimately en-
forced by judges exercising the power of judicial review through
the interpretation of positive law, when realization of these rights
as vested under standing legal rules did not infringe upon legisla-
tive power over the substance of legal rules.
The decision to protect only vested rights against the state
hence resists accurate characterization in terms of the categories of
natural law, positivism, formalism, or instrumentalism-
oppositions which may nonetheless seem inevitable to twentieth
century legal thinkers. What appears distinctive about antebellum
judicial review of individual rights is the shared sense of the jus-
ticiability of vested rights which made it possible to view judicial
protection of individual rights as legitimate, whether linked to the
144. Id.
145. Id. at 394.
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natural or positive law or reasoned about in a formal or instrumen-
tal manner. The vested right played the central role in a concep-
tual structure whose integrity was not viewed as threatened by the
contradiction between the alternative theories of law or styles of
legal reasoning. The vested right was both "positive" (in the sense
of reflecting a right derived from a legal rule acknowledged by the
sovereign) and "natural" (in the sense that its vested character de-
pended in some cases upon the "equities" of the party claiming the
right). Moreover, there might or might not be a text protecting the
vested right (and one might or might not be required), depending
upon the source of the Court's jurisdiction in the case.1 46 Finally,
the conflict between vested rights and legislative power might be
reasoned about through the instrumental arguments that could be
marshalled on behalf of stability and change and through the cate-
gorical distinctions between vested rights on the one hand, and
"mere expectations," "statutory privileges," and rights based on
"mere formalities" on the other.
The histories which attempt to link the evolution of antebel-
lum judicial review of individual rights to natural law or positivist
assumptions or formal or instrumental styles of legal reasoning
thus miss the way in which the concept of vested rights functioned
in legal thought to mediate the contradictions of political and
moral theory that would have been confronted had the legal elite
felt compelled to choose one of the alternative approaches to the
exclusion of the other. The point is that the concepts of legislative
sovereignty and vested rights were experienced as legal concepts
and hence different from their counterparts in political theory.
Thus reconstituted, they made it possible for the legal elite to deny
the existence of an irreconcilable conflict between judicial review of
individual rights and a democratically legitimated legislature. One
anonymous commentator summed up the mediating function of
the concept of vested rights by using it to prove illusory the seem-
ing contradiction between democratic legitimacy and an indepen-
dent judiciary entitled to invalidate statutes on behalf of individ-
ual rights:
A law is, from its very nature, an inflexible and universal rule, that governs
the conduct, and defines the rights and duties, of all persons subject to the
law-making power, during the whole period of its existence. It is not an un-
146. See infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
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changeable rule for the future, because the same power which enacted may
abrogate it, and put another in its place. But it is unchangeable in its applica-
tion to all cases which have grown up during its continuance. Adopt, then,
the most comprehensive and unlimited theory respecting the sovereignty of
the people; say that they may frame what enactments they like, on all man-
ner of subjects, or may even annul all existing statutes, and live without law
for all time to come. Still their power relates only to the present and the
future. The past is fixed and irrevocable. The sovereign may enact or abro-
gate what rules it pleases to govern coming events and the future conduct of
men; but it cannot annul the rights, the contracts, and the expectations
which have grown up under the laws that did exist. In respect to these, the
government covenanted with every individual, and every individual with the
government, that the statute should be respected and obeyed, on condition
that it should be fixed and universal in its obligation. The price has been
paid, and the fulfillment of the contract is demanded. Men have made bar-
gains, and contracted obligations, and regulated their conduct, in strict con-
formity with the law. And they now require, that those bargains should be
fulfilled, those obligations respected, and their conduct declared to be inno-
cent, and not liable to punishment ...
We now see the reason why the legal tribunals rightly claim to be consid-
ered as the fountains of equity, justice, and natural law, however arbitrary,
impolitic, and even unjust, may be the usages and the special enactments
which they are required to interpret and enforce. They are not responsible for
the intrinsic merits or defects of these customs and laws; that is the business
of the legislature. They only unfold and apply the great principle of natural
right, or law abstractly considered; which is, that the actions of men must be
judged, and their consequences determined, by a fixed law, promulgated at
the time when those acts were committed, imperative and permanent in its
obligation in reference to them, and definite and unchangeable in its applica-
tion. To ascertain what this law is, and to apply it to the case in hand, is the
high function of the courts. Public opinion cannot aid them in this task, for it
is not within the province even of Omnipotence to recall the past, or to alter
one jot of the eternal law of justice. The clamors of the multitude must be
unheeded, for the judges are listening to a voice as awful as that which pro-
claimed the law in thunder from the top of Mount Sinai. It is of law thus
abstractly considered, that the sublime language of Hooker hardly seems to
contain an exaggeration, when he says, that "its seat is the bosom of God,
and its voice is the harmony of the world.' 47
B. The Decision to Limit Federal Judicial Authority to Protect
Vested Rights
Although the decision for vested rights determined the man-
147. The Role of the Judiciary, in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMEucAN LAW 147 (C. Haar ed.
1965), excerpted from The Independence of the Judiciary, THE NoRTH AmERIcANR vmw
403 (1843).
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ner in which the Court reconciled judicial protection for individual
rights and legislative power, it left open the question of the extent
to which the protection of vested rights was legitimately a matter
for the federal or state judiciary. This section examines the inde-
pendent impact of jurisdictional limitations on the doctrines cre-
ated under the contract clause, which also became explicit only af-
ter Marshall's defeat in Ogden. The realization that the
significance of his defeat was in the Court's decision not to read
the contract clause to protect substantive rights against the state
suggests an alternative reading of the ideas influential in the cases
after Ogden, the importance of which has previously been under-
stood as part of a positivist jurisprudential trend.
One aspect of the potential federalism problem in the enforce-
ment of individual rights by the federal judiciary had been re-
solved by the decision in Ogden to protect only vested rights
against the state. Because Ogden resolved generally the problem of
the judicial and legislative role in the definition of individual rights
at the federal judicial level, it also incorporated a decision on how
to resolve federal judicial power and state legislative power over
individual rights. Marshall had attempted to take the initiative on
this aspect of Ogden by arguing that the protection of vested rights
by the Court would be more intrusive of state sovereignty than
would be *the Court's protection of substantive rights. Seizing on
the majority's failure to endorse expressly state legislative power to
alter contract remedies retrospectively, Marshall argued that the
effect of the holding would be a "mischievous abridgement of legis-
lative power over subjects within the proper jurisdiction of states,
by arresting their power to repeal or modify such laws with respect
to existing contracts. '"1 8 Only Johnson answered him directly:
I must not be understood here, as reasoning upon the assumption that the
remedy is grafted into the contract. I hold the doctrine untenable, and infi-
nitely more restrictive on State power than the doctrine contended for by the
opposite party. Since, if the remedy enters into the contract, then the States
lose all power to alter their laws for the administration of justice. . . . The
law of the contract remains the same every where, and it will be the same in
every tribunal; but the remedy necessarily varies, and with it the effect of the
constitutional pledge, which can only have relation to the laws of distributive
justice known to the policy of each State severally." 9
148. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 343 (1827).
149. Id. at 284-85.
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The other majority justices, who deferred decision on the right/
remedy question, answered Marshall's charge more generally, by
arguing that federal judicial enforcement of substantive rights en-
tailed the usurpation of state sovereignty in precisely the same way
as it infringed upon legislative sovereignty. Washington noted that
if the Court were to enforce the "common law of nations" which
"declares that men shall perform that to which they have agreed,"
without subordinating it to the "municipal laws of the land where
the contract was made, or is to be executed":
[I]t is very apparent, that the sphere of State legislation upon subjects con-
nected with the contracts of individuals, would be abridged beyond what it
can for a moment be believed the sovereign States of this Union would have
consented to; for it will be found, upon examination, that there are few laws
which concern the general police of a state, or the government of its citizens,
in their intercourse with each other, or with strangers, which may not in some
way or other affect the contracts which they have entered into, or may there-
after form.180
Thus, judicial review of vested rights was viewed as confining fed-
eral judicial power over individual rights against state legislative
power to the same extent that it was viewed as confining judicial
power to protect individual rights against legislative power. Fed-
eral judicial review of vested rights thus acknowledged both state
and legislative "sovereignty" over the substance of legal rules.
The decision to protect only vested rights against the state,
however, was independent of the jurisdictional problem about the
division of authority to define individual rights between the state
and federal courts. Since the sort of reasoning associated with judi-
cial review of vested rights was equally capable of application by
either the state or federal judiciary, the decision for vested rights
did not encompass an answer to the separate issue of which courts
should have final authority to define them. Of course, by the time
Ogden v. Saunders5 1 was decided, it was clear that there was con-
siderable federal judicial authority to review claims based on the
violation of vested rights. Yet the limitations (if any) on the au-
thority of the federal courts to protect vested rights, and their im-
plications for the division of federal and state judicial power over
individual rights against the state remained unsettled.
Ambiguity evident in the early cases between enforcing vested
150. Id. at 258-59.
151. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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rights as a matter of the general principles of constitutional law or
of express federal constitutional protection for the obligation of
contracts reflected the Court's concern with distinguishing between
its power to protect individual rights in cases arising under the di-
versity or federal question jurisdiction. The early cases that were
justified without reliance on the contract clause turn out to be
those appealed within the diversity jurisdiction, in which the Court
manifested a willingness to conceive itself the final authority over
all claims concerning the violation of vested rights. In contrast, the
cases justified by reliance upon the express protection for the obli-
gation of contracts were those appealed under the federal question
jurisdiction, where section 25 of the Judiciary Act required a
claimed violation of a federal constitutional provision as a predi-
cate to the exercise of the Court's power.15 2 For example, a unani-
mous Court in Terret v. Taylor,153 a diversity case, invalidated acts
of the Virginia legislature denying title in the Episcopal Church to
certain lands on a principle similar to that applied in Dartmouth
College without any reliance on the contract clause. Justice Story
wrote:
But that the legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations, or
confirming to them property already acquired under the faith of previous
laws, and by such repeal can vest the property of such corporations exclu-
sively in the state, or dispose of the same to such purposes as they may
please, without the consent or default of the corporators, we are not prepared
to admit; and we think ourselves standing upon the principles of natural jus-
tice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit
and the letter of the constitution of the United States, and upon the deci-
sions of most respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine.""
In contrast, in Dartmouth College itself, a federal question case
appealed under section 25 of the Judiciary Act, express reliance
was placed on the contract clause. 155
152. The Judiciary Act authorized Supreme Court review of lower federal court deci-
sions in civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeded two thousand dollars. There
was no requirement of a federal question. Section 25(c) provided for review of state court
decisions without regard for the amount in controversy, but only "where is drawn in ques-
tion the construction of any clause of the constitution, . . . and the decision is against the
title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed.. .. P. BATOR, P. MISHIKIN,
D. SHAIRo & H. WEcHsLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 35-36 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WEcHsLER].
153. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
154. Id. at 52.
155. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 519 (1819).
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Nonetheless, the question about the extent to which the Court
had final authority to define vested rights remained open until
Ogden v. Saunders.156 Nothing in the Court's interpretation of the
contract clause up to, and including Ogden, indicated that it was
conceived as narrower than the concept of vested rights applied in
diversity cases as a general principle of constitutional law. When
Ogden was decided, therefore, Marshall could note that it still was
not clear whether the Court would read the contract clause to pro-
tect all vested rights or only those "relating to contracts," and if
the latter, how the Court would delimit the universe of rights
"vested by contract."157
In two cases following Ogden, the Court directly addressed the
division of state and federal jurisdiction to protect vested rights by
formally distinguishing between the scope of its jurisdiction to re-
view state statutes in cases appealed from the state supreme courts
and those appealed from the federal circuit courts. Since there was
no general federal 4luestion jurisdiction in the lower federal courts,
the distinction between cases appealed from the federal circuit
courts and the state supreme courts corresponded to the distinc-
tion between cases appealed under the federal question jurisdiction
and those appealed within the diversity jurisdiction. 58 The first
was Satterlee v. Matthewson, a case appealed under section 25
from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 59 In that case, a statute
redefining the legal effect of certain land conveyances was applied
retrospectively to alter the plaintiff's title. The plaintiff claimed
that the statute violated the contract clause and divested a vested
right. Separating the question of whether the statute divested a
vested right from the question of whether it impaired a right
vested by contract, the Court (per Justice Washington) held that
the contract clause question was all that it could review when, as
in Satterlee, it was reviewing the decision of a state supreme court
under the Judiciary Act. 60 Washington noted further that the gen-
eral vested rights claim could be considered in a state court or in
156. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
157. Id. at 355-56.
158. There was no statute providing for general federal question jurisdiction in the
lower federal courts until 1875, except for a brief period at the end of the Adams and the
beginning of the Jefferson administrations. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 152, at 844-
50.
159. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829).
160. Id. at 409-10.
19821
BUFFALO LA W REVIEW
the Supreme Court if it were reviewing the decision of a federal
circuit court in a diversity case.1"1
To distinguish between claims based solely on the doctrine of
vested rights and those based on the contract clause, the Court dif-
ferentiated between "rights vested by contract" and all vested
property rights."6 2 In doing so, however, it did not disavow its ear-
lier statements concerning the general invalidity of all statutes di-
vesting vested rights. Endorsing "non-textual" rationales of the
earlier cases insofar as they could be understood to reflect the con-
cept of vested rights, the Court nonetheless held that it could en-
tertain claims based on a statute's divesting vested "property"
rights only in cases arising under the diversity jurisdiction, when it
was perceived to have a general jurisdiction equivalent to the state
courts:
In the case of Fletcher v. Peck, it was stated by the Chief Justice, that it
might well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government do
not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and he asks, "if any be
prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly
and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation?" It is nowhere
intimated in that opinion that a state statute, which devests a vested right, is
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and the case in which
that opinion was pronounced was removed into this court by writ of error,
not from the supreme court of a state, but from a circuit court.
We do not mean in any respect to impugn the correctness of sentiments
expressed in those cases, or to question the correctness of a circuit court,
sitting to administer the laws of a state, in giving to the constitution of that
state a paramount authority over a legislative act passed in violation of it. We
intend to decide no more than that the statute objected to in this case is not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and unless it be so, this
court has no authority, under the 25th section of the judiciary act, to re-
examine and to reverse the judgment of the supreme court of Pennsylvania in
the present case.6 3
Similarly, in Watson v. Mercer164 another case arising by writ of
error from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Court (per Jus-
tice Story) distinguished between a claim based on the contract
clause from one based on the general principle of vested rights and
held that, by virtue of the division between federal and state judi-
161. Id. at 414.
162. Id. at 412-14.
163. Id. at 413-14.
164. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834).
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cial authority, the second claim was beyond the Court's power to
review:
Our authority to examine into the constitutionality of the act of 1826, ex-
tends no farther than to ascertain whether it violates the Constitution of the
United States; for the question whether it violates the constitution of Penn-
sylvania is, upon the present writ of error, not before us.
The argument for the plaintiffs in error is, first, that the act violates the
Constitution of the United States, because it divests their vested right...
secondly, that it violates the obligations of a contract. .. . As to the first
point, it is clear, that this court has no right to pronounce an act of the state
legislature void, as contrary to the Constitution of the United States, from
the mere fact that it divests antecedent vested rights of property.""5
To establish the boundary between federal and state jurisdiction,
the Court therefore relied on the absence of an express federal pro-
hibition against takings of "property" by the states. 6
The distinction drawn by the Court between protecting vested
rights of property and rights vested by contract in order to limit
the scope of its appellate jurisdiction in federal question cases ex-
plains the emphasis on the express character of federal constitu-
tional restrictions on state power evident in the cases after Ogden
v. Saunders.16 7 As an express provision construed more narrowly
than the general constitutional prohibition against divesting vested
rights, the contract clause was perceived to confine the occasions
on which the Court was empowered by the Judiciary Act to review
the decisions of the state supreme courts. Thus, without undermin-
ing the belief that all statutes divesting vested rights were uncon-
stitutional as a matter of general constitutional principles, the
Court held that the few express limitations on state power con-
tained in the federal Constitution defined the instances in which
the Court had authority to declare them so by reversing a decision
of the state supreme courts. When the violation of one of the ex-
press provisions was required as a jurisdictional predicate for the
165. Id. at 109-10.
166. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which held the fifth
amendment inapplicable to the states. That case, appealed under section 25 from the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, was also decided in a jurisdictional context. See also Proprietors of
the Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 539, 580, 582-83 (1837)
(no federal judicial power to protect vested rights unless the obligation of a contract im-
paired; takings of private property and compensation therefore a matter of local
jurisdiction).
167. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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exercise of the Supreme Court's appellate power over state court
decisions, the Court's authority was limited, and it could not pro-
tect all vested rights by applying for itself principles understood to
inform the constitutional law of the states. When sitting to review
cases where the federal jurisdictional predicate was diversity of cit-
izenship, however, the Court could act as though it were a court of
general jurisdiction and apply for itself the general principles of
constitutional law which, as these were understood after Ogden,
protected vested (but not substantive) rights.
In interpreting the contract clause to protect only a subset of
all vested rights, the Court analogized it to the ex post facto clause
which, when read to apply only to criminal statutes, was also con-
ceived to limit federal jurisdiction over state interference with
vested rights.16 In a separate opinion and appendix in Satterlee,
Justice Johnson took the occasion to argue that Calder v. Bull',
had been wrongly decided, and that the ex post facto, bill of at-
tainder, and contract clauses should be read as a mandate for the
Court to protect all vested rights, regardless of the jurisdictional
predicate in the case. 170 Even the dissenters in Ogden, however,
rejected the complete merger of state and federal constitutional re-
strictions on behalf of individual rights which would follow from
Johnson's argument, since it seemed to deny any area of state judi-
cial autonomy over their own constitutional protection for individ-
ual rights. 71 In summing up the Court's role in protecting individ-
ual rights against the states in the federal system, Sedgwick later
reflected this concern for state judicial autonomy by comparing the
states' power to divest vested rights (not covered by the contract
clause) to their power to violate their own express constitutional
provisions:
[S]o far as regards the legislation of the several States, the courts of the
United States have no right to interfere by virtue of the restraining power of
the Federal Constitution, except in the two cases of ex post facto laws, and
laws impairing the obligation of contracts. The States may pass retrospective
laws, however unjust; pass acts of a judicial nature, however clearly overstep-
168. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
169. Id.
170. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 414-16, 681-87 (1829). Johnson had
made a similar argument in Ogden, 25 U.S. at 286.
171. Marshall and Story joined in the Court's Satterlee opinion and Marshall joined in
Story's opinion for the Court in Watson. Marshall also wrote for a unanimous court in Bar-
ron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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ping the line of legislative power; they may pass acts divesting vested rights;
they may violate express provisions of their own Constitutions;-acts of these
classes, however objectionable, are not within the scope of the restriction of
the Federal Constitution, and give no right of appeal from the decisions of
the State tribunals. Questions of this nature can only be presented in the
Supreme Court of the United States in cases arising in the circuit courts,
within the jurisdiction given to them under the Constitution of the United
States, and where, consequently, the circuit courts exercise all the powers of
the State tribunals.17 2
The independent significance of the contract clause as a writ-
ten constitutional restriction was therefore realized only after
Ogden in the distinction drawn by the Court in Satterlee and
Watson between rights vested by contract and vested rights of
property. The importance of that distinction lay in the decision to
limit federal judicial authority over the protection of vested rights.
It therefore embodied a solution to a different role problem (fed-
eral courts/state courts) from that solved by the decision for vested
rights (court/legislature). Thus, rather than reflect a jurispruden-
tial shift, the disappearance of express endorsements of the general
principle of vested rights in the contract clause cases indicated a
decision to limit federal jurisdiction over vested rights by reading
the contract clause to authorize appellate review (in federal ques-
tion cases coming from the state supreme courts) over only a sub-
set of all vested rights.
Additional evidence for this proposition exists in the Court's
continuing practice of enforcing vested rights as a general principle
of, constitutional law, independent of positive restrictions, in diver-
sity cases appealed from the circuit courts where the Court was
understood to have jurisdictional authority equivalent to the state
courts. In these cases, the question about the limits of the Court's
authority to protect vested rights, resolved in favor of express re-
strictions in the contract clause cases on the basis of the Court's
limited appellate jurisdiction, reappeared in the guise of discus-
sions about whether the principle of vested rights was a general
feature of republican government or simply a consequence of the
express provisions of the various state constitutions.
Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull7 5 provides an early
example. Chase began his analysis with the "self-evident proposi-
172. T. SEDGWICK, supra note 83, at 603-05.
173. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386 (1798).
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tion, that the several state legislatures retain all the powers of leg-
islation, delegated to them by the state constitutions, which are
not expressly taken away by the constitution of the United
States.' 4 He later concluded that the ex post facto clause applies
only to criminal legislation and that therefore the federal Constitu-
tion did not prohibit the statute. Thereafter, he noted the prob-
lematic character of the Court's assuming jurisdiction to pass on
the validity of the act under the constitution of Connecticut, con-
cluding that even if it had jurisdiction, it was clear that the state
constitution had not been violated. 75 Yet after dismissing both
sources of express restrictions, Chase was not finished; he ended by
inquiring into whether the act of the Connecticut legislature
divested a vested right-the sort of inquiry that was later explic-
itly understood as appropriate in diversity cases (such as Calder)
when the Court had jurisdictional authority equivalent to the state
courts to apply the general principles of constitutional law "de-
rived from the nature of republican government.' 7
The idea that the Court could consider all claims to vested
rights in diversity cases sustained (at the federal level) ambiguity
regarding the appropriate authority for application of the principle
of vested rights (textual or non-textual) throughout the antebellum
period, even after the Court rejected the application of the entire
doctrine through express federal restrictions. When the Court in
Satterlee, for example, affirmed the portion of Fletcher v. Peck'"
rationalizing the protection of vested rights as a consequence of
the "nature of society and of government" for subsequent applica-
tion in diversity cases, it made no attempt to show that the princi-
ple of vested rights had been expressly authorized by the Georgia
Constitution or adopted by its own courts. 17 8 It did note that some
other federal cases applying the principle of vested rights "were
founded, expressly on the constitution of the respective states in
which those cases were tried.' 7 9 Similarly, Story noted the issue
one year before writing Watson, in his Commentaries:
There is nothing in the constitution of the United States, which forbids a
174. Id. at 387.
175. Id. at 392-93.
176. Id. at 394.
177. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
178. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 414 (1829).
179. Id.
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state legislature from exercising judicial functions; nor from divesting rights,
vested by law in an individual; provided its effect be not to impair the obliga-
tion of a contract. If such a law be void. it is upon principles derived from the
general nature of free governments, and the necessary limitations created
thereby, or from the state restrictions upon the legislative authority, and not
from the prohibitions of the constitution of the United States."180
Writing in 1857, Sedgwick manifested the ambiguity in his
support for the principle of vested rights. Although considering
himself a staunch proponent of "written law" and an ardent foe of
judicial authority to declare "the doctrines of natural law and ab-
stract right," Sedgwick defended the practice of the state courts
and the Supreme Court (in diversity cases) of protecting vested
rights "which do not come within the prohibition of the positive
clauses in our Constitution, State or Federal."18 1 Although noting
the increasing tendency to enforce the states' "law of the land"
and "due process" clauses to protect individual rights, Sedgwick
made a point of showing that the "rather speculative questions"
raised under those provisions could be better understood by refer-
ence to the principle of vested rights:
And this brings us to the precise question of vested rights; for the prohibi-
tion, so far as it exists, of retrospective acts, whether direct or in the shape of
repealing statutes, and the non-interference, so far as it is enforced, with
vested rights, in cases which do not come within the prohibition of the posi-
tive clauses in our Constitution, State or Federal, in regard to private prop-
erty and contracts, will be found to be summed up in the idea that the legis-
lature can only make laws, or legislative enactments, as contradistinguished
from judicial sentences and decrees.
If we renounce, as I think we must, the idea that the validity of law can
be determined by the judiciary on abstract notions of justice and right; if we
admit, as we must, that the denial of the right to make retrospective laws
cannot, as a universal proposition, be maintained,-then outside of the cases
depending on positive constitutional inhibitions, no other restriction can be
imposed on legislative action except such as is derived from the idea, per-
haps, as we have said, expressed with equal clearness in the guaranty of the
law of the land, that legislative power only is granted to it, and that vested
180. J. STORY, supra note 143, § 1392, at 266-67.
181. T. SEDGWICK, supra note 83, at 604. See also supra text accompanying note 174.
Whatever the glories of our past history, however grand our present, however
brilliant our future, it is in vain to suppose that American freedom can be main-
tained except just so long as our people shall exhibit the capacity justly and
intelligently to administer, and the disposition steadily and loyally to obey the
government of WRITTEN LAW.
T. SEDGWICK, supra note 83, at 663.
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rights of property can only be interfered with by it so far as is competent to
be done by the enactment of laws.
This, however, is merely a circuitous statement of the proposition that
vested rights are sacred. 1
82
Writing in 1868, Cooley reported (and himself perfected) the ab-
sorption of all vested rights into the states' due process and law of
the land clauses. With this accomplished, he could state
authoritatively:
In creating a legislative department and conferring upon it the legislative
power, the people must be understood to have conferred the full and com-
plete power as it rests in, and may be exercised by, the sovereign power of
any country, subject only to such restrictions as they may have seen fit to
impose, and to the limitations which are contained in the Constitution of the
United States.' 8 3
In effect, Cooley resolved the ambiguity after rendering it a dis-
tinction without a difference. Nonetheless, the point remains the
same: the importance of the dispute about support for the princi-
ple of vested rights on textual or non-textual grounds at the state
constitutional level, like the earlier dispute at the federal level, was
subordinate to the continued understanding that either approach
supported judicial protection for only vested rights against the
state.
The impact of jurisdictional concerns on the contract clause
can therefore be summed up in the limited federal protection for
vested rights enforced by the Court in deference to its limited ju-
risdiction over cases appealed from the state courts. This develop-
ment, which left part of the realization of the general principle
that "vested rights are sacred" to the state courts, did not under-
mine the sense in which the legal elite understood the entire
corpus of constitutional protections for individual rights to be uni-
fied around the conception of the judicial role prescribed by the
concept of vested rights. Although disputes about the cases in
which it was appropriate to refer to principles outside the scope of
express federal or state constitutional provisions affected the divi-
sion of power over individual rights between the state and federal
182. T. SEnowcK, supra note 83, at 649.
183. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 87. See Chapter XI, entitled Of the Protection to
Property by the "Law of the Land". "[T]he phrase 'due process [or course] of law' is some-
times employed, and sometimes 'the law of the land,' and sometimes both; but the meaning
is the same in every case." Id. at 353.
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judiciaries, they occurred within a more general understanding of
the concept of vested rights as the determinant of the legitimate
judicial role in protecting individual rights against the state. The
decision to limit the scope of the contract clause to its "express"
parameters thus embodied a solution to a separate problem of fed-
eral jurisdiction which, although an important influence in subse-
quent contract clause litigation, did not indicate a further ebb or
flow in beliefs about natural law or positivism to which it makes
sense to attribute the development of antebellum rights against
the state.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT AND BREAKDOWN OF VESTED RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
The decision for vested rights thus represented the dominant
conception among the legal elite of the judicial role in defining in-
dividual rights against the state. Its purpose was to legitimate judi-
cial review of individual rights by confining it to the protection of
the interest generated when individuals relied upon the standing
law. This limitation purported to structure judicial review so that
decisions to protect individual rights against the state would not
reproduce the sort of judgments-about the substantive fairness or
reasonableness of legal rules-thought to distinguish legislative
choice.
The problem which eventually surfaced in enforcing vested
rights was that the Court was forced to make the same kind of
choices that it thought it had rejected by not extending the con-
tract clause to protect substantive rights. Generally, it became in-
creasingly understood that the notion of reliance on the standing
law contained no logical stopping point short of freezing the entire
existing regime of legal rules. Since it was always possible to argue
that a newly enacted statute (whether retrospective or prospective)
interfered with a right defined by the standing law upon which an
individual had relied, the Court found itself forced to protect only
some existing rights, chosen from the universe of those defined by
the standing law. And because the decisions about which rights
vested against the subsequent exercise of legislative power re-
quired more than the protection of the "neutral" reliance interest,
it began to recast judicial review of individual rights around doc-
trines which directly acknowledged review of the substance of leg-
islative choice.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
That the concept of vested rights is unlimited, and hence inca-
pable of generating a coherent boundary between legislative power
and individual rights, seems to be a commonplace of modern legal
thought.184 Moreover, this insight appears to have had its origin in
the critique of the concept of vested rights as it had developed by
the early twentieth century. In a 1927 article, for example, Bryant
R. Smith saw the following as obvious:
[I]f. . a law is retrospective which extinguishes rights acquired under previ-
ously existing laws, then all exercises of the police power, and indeed, all laws
of any kind whatsoever, are retrospective. There is no such thing as a law
that does not extinguish rights, powers, privileges, or immunities acquired
under previously existing laws. That is what laws are for. 185
The historical task is therefore to show how this understanding
emerged from the actual experience of the legal elite in enforcing
vested rights in the nineteenth century. Before describing that pro-
cess, however, it is useful to begin with a theoretical presentation
of the reason why the notion of protecting only "existing entitle-
ments" does not make it possible to avoid the substantive judg-
ments the Court sought to reject in limiting judicial review to
vested rights.
The theoretical statement of the incoherence of the concept of
vested rights is facilitated by a Hohfeldian description of the con-
cept of a legal order. In a now famous article, Hohfeld developed
184. See, e.g., Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive
Lawmaking, 48 CALF. L. REV. 216 (1960). Slawson distinguishes between "vested-rights"
and "method" retroactivity. Vested-rights-retroactivity conceives as retroactive any law
which acts upon an existing legal entitlement. Method-retroactivity conceives as retroactive
only those laws which make "present rights and duties depend upon past events." Slawson
argues that the category of vested-rights-retroactive laws is illimitable and includes laws
ordinarily thought of as prospective. He therefore concludes: "To ask whether a law is
vested-right-retroactive is only to restate the question of its sufficiency in light of substan-
tive due process. Vested-rights-retroactivity is a superfluous category." Id. at 251. Slawson
also argues that whether a statute is method-retroactive is "largely irrelevant." Although it
may indicate whether a party had the opportunity to make a choice that could have averted
a legal consequence now attached to a past action, the range of factors relevant to the per-
missibility of the current imposition is such as to swamp the importance of the opportunity
for choice. Moreover, Slawson notes that the distinction between "vested-rights" and
"method" retroactivity is at best tenuous; if the "past events" to which legal consequences
are conceived to attach are defined broadly enough to include any act or omission under-
taken in reliance on the legal regime, then the category of method-retroactive laws would
include all those that would be included as vested-rights-retroactive. Hence, Slawson con-
cludes that any attempt to create special rules for retroactive statutes represents "wasted
effort." Id.
185. Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tax. L. Rav. 231, 233 (1927).
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an exhaustive vocabulary to describe the entire universe of possible
modes of entitlement in a legal order which presupposes a legiti-
mate and efficacious state.18 He then erected those entitlements
into a table of jural correlatives which, alone or in combination,
describe the logical possibilities of any legal relation protected by
that order. The table appeared as follows:
JURAL CORRELATIVES
right privilege power immunity
duty no-right liability disability187
Besides providing a convenient vocabulary to serve the formal pur-
pose of analytic clarity, Hohfeld used this vocabulary to teach a
substantive lesson which has since become a staple of modern legal
thought. The lesson was that privilege/no-right relations were as
real, and as much a consequence of the legal order, as were right/
duty relations. Corbin later put the point as follows:
[O]ne who thinks that there can be no rule of law and no jural relation be-
tween men without societal constraint seems to insist that law does nothing
but command. There is no doubt that the command element is of the utmost
importance; and according to Hohfeld's classification this element is the fac-
tor that defines rights and duties. But it also seems to some of us that society
not only commands but also permits .... The rules that determine these
permissions. . . are rules that law schools have to teach, that lawyers have to
use in advising clients, and that courts have to create and apply in rendering
judgments. And this is true whether there is any societal command or con-
straint then existing or not. 8'
The important substantive lesson of Hohfeld's insight for the
notion of entitlements defined at any given moment by the stand-
ing law is that if one counts all the entitlements defined by a legal
order one discovers that any legal order defines not only a set of
legal relations, but rather a complete set of legal relations which
governs the legal consequences of all activity. This discovery may
be denominated the rule of completeness of any legal order: in-
stances which appear "ungoverned" by the legal order are in fact
186. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
187. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, supra note 186, at 36.
188. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 237 (1921).
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cases in which the state, by not prohibiting certain activity, creates
a legal privilege to engage in the permitted action.""'
Moreover, since there is no reason not to attribute privileges
to the standing law, there is also no reason to discount reliance
upon them. To take a recent example, it would simply be a confu-
sion to say that existing FCC regulations do not create a legal rela-
tion between a seller of home decoders of pay TV signals and the
operator of the station because they do not define a right/duty re-
lation prohibiting the sale. Instead, it would be accurate to say
that the regulations define a privilege/no-right relation which cre-
ates the legal permission to sell the decoders. And once the rela-
tion is defined in this fashion, it becomes clear that a subsequent
change in the regulations would operate to upset an existing legal
entitlement, the privilege, no less than would a law designed to re-
peal a Hohfeldian right.190
The rule of completeness of any legal order illustrates clearly
the incoherence of a mode of judicial review which claims to pro-
tect reliance on the standing law by disallowing legislative altera-
tion of existing rights. Since the standing law defines a complete
set of entitlements, it is impossible to protect all those "existing"
without freezing the entire legal regime. Were the legislature to
create any new rule, it would necessarily act to change an existing
legal relation and not to create one where one did not exist before.
Because the law current before the exercise of legislative power de-
fines a complete set of legal relations, to exercise any legislative
power is to change the existing distribution of entitlements.191
189. Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
711, 760 (1980).
Entitlement abhors a vacuum. Covering any act that anyone can be imagined to
do or suffer, there is always either a privilege or a right, therefore always either
a duty or a no-right. The agent either is legally sanctionable for the act or omis-
sion (i.e., has a duty) or she is not (i.e., has a privilege); a victim either can
secure relief(i.e., has a right) or he cannot (i.e., has a no-right). There is no un-
distributed middle.
Id.
190. Similarly, to discount reliance upon privileges would be to render unintelligible the
concept of ex post facto criminal legislation. What is protected by the ex post facto clause is
the Hohfeldian privilege, defined by the standing criminal law, to engage in conduct not
defined as criminal. More generally, reliance upon the "innocence" of certain conduct is the
same as reliance on a privilege defined by the legal order to act without legally binding
consequence.
191. Hohfeld's table of jural opposites defines the logical possibilities of such a change
and simultaneously demonstrates that the creation of any one of the entitlements requires
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The demonstration of the incoherence of a mode of judicial
review based on the concept of vested rights through Hohfeldian
analysis and its implication for the completeness of any legal order
is of more than analytic interest. In noting that "all laws . . .
whatsoever. . . extinguish rights, powers, privileges, and immuni-
ties acquired under previously existing laws," Smith seems to have
had in mind precisely the argument developed above.192 The analy-
sis therefore demonstrates a conclusion actually drawn by the legal
elite after the gradual emergence into legal consciousness of the
kind of analysis given formal expression by Hohfeld: the emer-
gence of the modern analysis of legal relations undermined the
concepts which had previously structured vested rights review.
The most complete view we have of the doctrines which made
vested rights review plausible to the nineteenth century legal elite
is contained in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations.19 3 In his chap-
ters on the contract and due process clauses, Cooley summed up
antebellum wisdom about the constitutional protection of individ-
ual rights by attempting to collate and rationalize the cases into a
coherent structure. The classifications he employed to determine
whether legal interests were vested or not provide a clear picture of
the boundary doctrines whose demise in late nineteenth century
legal thought exposed the incoherence of the concept of vested
rights.
At the core of Cooley's presentation were two categorical dis-
tinctions which defined the boundaries of vested rights. The first
was that between "property" interests and "interests in
expectancy":
And it would seem that a right cannot be considered a vested right, unless it
is something more than a mere expectation, and has already become a title,
the negation or "repeal" of its opposite, as defined by prior law.
JURAL OPPOSITES
right privilege power immunity
no-right duty disability liability
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, supra
note 186, at 36. Further, the change of any one of the entitlements to its opposite also
necessarily entails the change of the correlative to which it is related. (Changing A's right to
a no-right entails changing B's duty to a privilege; changing A's disability to a power entails
changing B's immunity to a liability, etc.).
192. Smith, supra note 185, at 137.
193. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46.
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legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or the pre-
sent or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand
made by another. As Mr. Justice Woodbury expresses it, acts of the legisla-
ture cannot be regarded as opposed to fundamental axioms of legislation,
"unless they impair rights which are vested; because most civil rights are de-
rived from public laws; and, if, before the rights become vested in particular
individuals, the convenience of the State procures amendments or repeals of
those laws, those individuals have no cause of complaint. The power that au-
thorizes or proposes to give may always revoke before an interest is perfected
in the donee."
To particularize: a mere expectation of property in the future is not a
vested right.
19
'
The second was the distinction between "rights" and "remedies":
[T]he right to a particular remedy is not a vested right. This is the general
rule; and the exceptions are of those peculiar cases where the remedy is a
part of the right itself.....
... Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to
the will of the State, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of
the contract; and it does not impair it, provided it leaves the parties a sub-
stantial remedy, according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the
contract was made.
It has accordingly been held that laws changing remedies for the enforce-
ment of legal contracts will be valid, notwithstanding the new remedy is less
convenient than the old, or less prompt and speedy.
But a law which deprives a party of all legal remedy must necessarily be
void.19
5
Surrounding these core distinctions were various qualifying doc-
trines such as the requirement that a law changing a remedy leave
a "substantial" remedy in its stead. At the periphery of the vested
rights logic was the doctrine of "no vested right to do wrong," ap-
plied where it did not appear possible to resolve the cases without
direct consideration of the equities of the parties. As one moved
from the core to the periphery, the doctrines became increasingly
controversial,198 but the resulting disputes did not threaten the ba-
sic structure. The classification of legal interests into rights and
remedies and property and expectant interests constituted the con-
ceptual apparatus informing the belief that there was an underly-
194. Id. at 359 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 361, 286-87, 289 (citations omitted).
196. See, e.g., the dispute between Cooley and Sedgwick over the "no vested right to do
wrong" doctrine discussed supra at notes 89-92.
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ing objective legal analysis which determined whether a right was
vested. Insofar as a vested right did not necessarily include the
remedy for its violation and a legal interest did not vest in an indi-
vidual until it became his "property," it was possible for the legal
elite to avoid the conclusion that all statutes upset a legal interest
upon whose continuance an individual could claim reliance.
The demonstration of the incoherence of the vested rights
analysis by early twentieth century legal thinkers therefore can be
understood as the result of the protracted breakdown of the cen-
tral belief in the meaningfulness of those two categorical distinc-
tions. Smith, for example, devoted much of his critique of vested
rights 97 to an attack on the distinction drawn in the cases between
statutes divesting rights and those "merely" altering remedies.
Quoting Corbin's definition of a legal right as "the legal relation of
A to B when society commands action or forbearance by B and
will at the instance of A in some manner penalize disobedience,"
Smith revealed how the Hohfeldian analysis of legal relations un-
derstood entitlements to include, or perhaps more accurately, to be
defined by, the remedy available under the standing law.19 Em-
ploying Corbin's definition, Smith argued that the only principle to
be divined from the cases was that the extent of the interference
with existing entitlements determined the permissibility of any
statute, a question not answered by the classification of legal inter-
ests into rights and remedies:
"A right, in a legal sense, exists, when in consequence of a given fact the law
declares that the person is entitled to enforce against another a claim, or to
resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another." On this analysis, the
right is not safe unless the remedy is also protected. The individual may not
complain if for an old remedy the legislature substitutes a new one equally
effective for his purposes, but where a remedy is extinguished or substantially
impaired and no alternative remedy provided, whether we say the remedy is
the right, or whether we recognize a distinction, the result is the same in
either case, namely, that, without the remedy, the right, for practical pur-
poses, is also gone. This is equally true whether the change be in procedure,
rules of evidence, competency of witnesses, or any other branch of so-called
adjective law.""
197. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
198. Smith, supra note 185, at 243 (quoting Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology,
29 YALE L.J. 163, 167 (1919)).
199. Smith, supra note 185, at 243 (quoting Justice Slayton in Mellinger v. City of
Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 45, 3 S.W. 249, 253 (1887)).
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A similar breakdown occurred with respect to the distinction
between "property" and "expectant" interests. In a 1925 Comment
entitled The Variable Quality of a Vested Right, the author began
by noting:
"Right" is here used in its general sense; but by splitting the term into some
of its component legal parts of "right," "power," "privilege," and "immu-
nity," the nature of the interest is made more manifest. Property interests
are no more than legal relations of lesser or greater value, any one of which
may accurately be brought within the popular term, "private property."' 00
Insofar as the concept of property had come to include any legally
protected interest, the writer argued, as had Smith, that whether a
right had vested was a question of the extent to which "the rights
of an individual" could be "subordinated to the prevailing views of
justice," a question no longer answered by the application of the
concept of "property":
Is the property interest involved so sacred that it may not be impaired at all?
• ..[W]e are driven to the conclusion that the term "vested right".
is one of convenience and not of definition. It cannot mean more than a prop-
erty interest, the infringement of which would shock society's sense of justice.
For the idea of a "vested right" is less legal than political and sociological.
The traditions, mores, and instincts of a community determine it.21
The reconceptualization of the legal concept of property to include
all legally protected interests, and the reconceptualization of legal
interests as defined by the rules regulating the action or forbear-
ance of courts in administering remedies led to the conclusion that
the protection of rights as vested was substantive due process by
another name.20 2 As the basis in legal logic for the distinction be-
tween property and expectant interests and rights and remedies
collapsed, it became manifest that all statutes upset existing legal
entitlements, none of which had a higher priority in legal analysis.
Hence it seemed inescapable that rights granted the appellation
"vested" were those found deserving of protection on "other
grounds":
Any useful discussion of the subject is necessarily concerned with the separa-
tion of the good from the bad. What makes one retroactive law valid and
another invalid?
200. Comment, The Variable Quality of a Vested Right, 34 YALE L.J. 303 n.1 (1925).
201. Id. at 304, 307.
202. See Slawson, supra note 184, at 224-25.
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It is submitted that the distinction between vested and non-vested
rights, like that between rights and remedies . . . is of use primarily as a
basis on which to classify decisions after they have already been reached on
other grounds2'0
A. The Abstraction of the Property Right
The history of the transformation of the concept of property
in nineteenth century legal analysis is traced in a recent article by
Kenneth Vandevelde. °0 Vandevelde shows the early nineteenth
century conception of property as rooted in Blackstone's notion of
"dominion over things."20 5 Where property was not embodied in a
tangible thing, as in the case of incorporeal hereditaments or
choses in action, the law fictionalized a "thing" to explain away the
exception. During the nineteenth century, however, judges in com-
mon law cases created and acknowledged property rights which
could not easily be understood as either physical things or as one
of the traditionally recognized fictional things. Vandevelde argues
that as the exceptions mounted and the traditional categories be-
came strained, judges increasingly came to view property rights as
relations among persons and not as things.20 By the beginning of
the twentieth century, the concept of property had become entirely
"de-physicalized," and as such became an all-inclusive term signi-
fying any of the Hohfeldian legal interests.
A similar development can be traced in the constitutional
cases. 20 7 Campbell v. Holt, a transitional case, illustrates the trans-
formation.20 8 In Campbell, a state constitutional provision sus-
pending the operation of the statute of limitations in civil cases
was applied against a party in whose favor the limitations period
had run prior to the enactment of the suspension. The party whose
liability under a previous contract had been thus revived chal-
203. Smith, supra note 185, at 240, 246.
204. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of
the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325 (1980).
205. Id. at 328.
206. Id. at 330, 359-63.
207. For example, Sedgwick noted: "[Ilt seems sufficiently clear, as a general rule, that
the Legislature cannot interfere with existing rights of property; but when we leave the
subject of vested interests in real estate or actual property in possession, we find the subject
surrounded with difficulty." T. SEDGWIcK, supra note 83, at 653-54.
208. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
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lenged the suspension as violative of his vested property rights
under the federal due process clause. 09
Prior to Campbell, there had been much litigation about
whether a statute retroactively amending a limitations period
could be applied without divesting a vested right. Cooley had ar-
gued that a change in the limitations period could not be applied
to existing causes of action unless the amendment provided for a
reasonable time for the affected party to try his rights in court.
The idea appeared to be that a party whose claim would be extin-
guished had a chose in action that was his property no less than
his house or his land:
But a vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible
things are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary interference.
Where it springs from contract or from the principles of the common law, it
is not competent for the legislature to take it away.2 1
Cooley also argued that a statute reviving a time-barred claim to
tangible property was void as divesting the party now possessing
the property of his "title":
When the period prescribed by statute has already run, so as to extinguish a
claim which one might have made to property in the possession of another,
the title to the property, irrespective of the original right, will be regarded as
vested in the possessor, so as to entitle him to the same protection that the
owner is entitled to in other cases. A subsequent repeal of the limitation law
could not be given a retroactive effect, so as to disturb this title.211
Campbell, however, presented a more difficult case. Since the
statute had run to extinguish a debt and not to extinguish claim to
the possession of land, the defendant's right not to respond in
damages was not classifiable (traditionally) as "property." A di-
vided Supreme Court applied the traditional classification and
hence upheld the application of the provision to revive the time-
barred debt. For the Court, Justice Miller wrote:
It is much insisted that this right to defence is a vested right, and a right of
property which is protected by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We understand very well what is meant by a vested right to real estate,
to personal property, or to incorporeal hereditaments. But when we get be-
yond this, although vested rights may exist, they are better described by
209. Id.
210. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 362 (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 365 (citations omitted).
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some more exact term, as the phrase itself is not found in the language of the
Constitution.
We are unable to see how a man can be said to have property in the bar
of the statute as a defence to his promise to pay. In the most liberal extension
of the use of the word property, to choses in action, to incorporeal rights, it is
new to call the defence of lapse of time to the obligation to pay money,
property.
2 1 2
In a vigorous dissent joined by Justice Harlan, Justice Bradley at-
tacked the Court's understanding of the term property and em-
ployed it in the sense of any valuable legal interest:
That clause of the amendment which declares that "no State shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," was in-
tended to protect every valuable right which a man has.
It is not confined to mere tangible property, but extends to every
species of vested right. In my judgment, it would be a very narrow and tech-
nical construction to hold otherwise. In an advanced civilization like ours, a
very large portion of the property of individuals is not visible and tangible,
but consists in rights and claims against others, or against the government
itself.
Now, an exemption for a demand, or an immunity from prosecution in a
suit, is as valuable to the one party as the right to the demand or to prosecute
the suit is to the other. The two things are correlative, and to say that the
one is protected by constitutional guaranties and that the other is not, seems
to me almost an absurdity. One right is as valuable as the other. My property
is as much imperiled by an action against me for money, as it is by an action
against me for my land or my goods. It may involve and sweep away all that I
have in the world. Is not a right of defence to such an action of the greatest
value to me? If it is not property in the sense of the Constitution, then we
need another amendment to that instrument. But it seems to me that there
can hardly be a doubt that it is property.213
The debate in Campbell portrays the legal elite gradually ac-
knowledging the incoherence of the principles of inclusion and ex-
clusion provided by the conception of property as a thing. By 1909,
James Barr Ames criticized Campbell as standing almost alone,
and a 1918 California case cited decisions in twenty states as dis-
approving the distinction between limitations laws extinguishing
debts and those extinguishing title to tangible property.21' A 1919
212. 115 U.S. at 628-29.
213. Id. at 630-31 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
214. J. AMEs, 3 SELECT ESSAYS 569 (1909); Chambers v. Gallagher, 177 Cal. 704, 171 P.
931 (1918), both cited in Clark, Adverse Possession of One's Own Debt, 29 YALE L.J. 91, 92
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Connecticut decision following Campbell provided the occasion for
Charles E. Clark to return to the subject, and his analysis, entitled
Adverse Possession of One's Own Debt, demonstrates the collapse
in the understanding of the "physicalness" of property:
We often think of a chose in action as a physical thing, but in reality it is an
aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities of the creditor of which
the more important correlatives (duties, etc.) are in the debtor. But it must
also be remembered that when A owns a physical thing he has only rights,
etc. against X, Y, and Z.215
Having moved from the conception of property rights as embodied
in things to the conception of property rights as embodied in legal
relations among persons, Clark could then show easily the funda-
mental similarity between the legal privilege of an adverse posses-
sor of chattels and choses: "[T]he relations are so nearly identical
as logically to require similar rulings in the absence of a compelling
reason of policy." 6
Another example of the effect of the abstraction of the prop-
erty right is contained in the history of the distinction initially
drawn by the Court between retrospective laws which enlarged
rather than diminished the obligation of contracts. In Satterlee v.
Mathewson,' 7 the Court upheld a law retroactively validating a
contract previously held void under the common law of Pennsylva-
nia: "[I]t surely cannot be contended, that to create a contract, and
to destroy or impair one, mean the same thing." ' 8 Similarly, in
Watson v. Mercer, the Court upheld a law retroactively validating
the conveyances of property by married women previously void for
the failure to observe certain requirements on the ground that it
"confirmed" rather than impaired the obligation of contracts.2 19 By
the end of the century, however, the Court was at least implicitly
assuming that enlarging the obligation of contracts violated the
contract clause as much as diminishing it. 220
The jurisdictional boundary drawn in Satterlee and Watson
between rights vested by contract and vested property rights made
n.4 (1919).
215. Clark, supra note 214, at 92 n.6.
216. Id. at 92.
217. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829).
218. Id. at 413.
219. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 111 (1834).
220. Hale, supra note 1, at 514-16.
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the issue in those cases easier for the Court. Although the right to
avoid liability under the law as it existed prior to the challenged
statutes might have been viewed as a property (if not contract)
right, the jurisdictional boundary placed that issue beyond the
purview of the Supreme Court. Cooley, however, in discussing both
the state and federal cases, had to explain why, if the statutes did
not violate the contract clause, they did not in any case divest a
vested property right.
Cooley treated these and similar cases upholding what were
labelled "curative acts" imposing additional liabilities by classify-
ing defenses to legal liability separately: "[A] party has no vested
right in a defence based upon an informality not affecting his
substantial interests. 221 The idea appears to be that the defenses
themselves were not property unlike the claims of liability which
were vested rights (or choses) in action. The only difficult case for
Cooley was therefore the case in which a statute, by extinguishing
a defense previously available under the law, had the effect of
transferring title to property:
Other cases ... hold that, although [a] deed was originally ineffectual for the
purpose of conveying the title, [a] healing statute may accomplish the intent
of the parties by giving it effect. At first sight these cases might seem to go
beyond the mere confirmation of a contract, and to be at least technically
objectionable, as depriving a party of property without due process of law;
since they proceeded upon the assumption that the title still remained in the
grantor, and that the healing act was required for the purpose of divesting
him of it, and passing it over to the grantee. 222
Although a hard case because the right to the defense appeared to
be embodied in a thing (as in the case of adverse possession of real
property), Cooley nonetheless argued that the "curative" statute
was permissible. Here he resorted to the distinction between "le-
gal" and "equitable" title and argued:
The right which the healing act takes away in such case is the right in the
party to avoid his contract,--a naked legal right, which it is usually unjust to
insist upon, and which no constitutional provision was ever designed to pro-
tect. As put by Chief Justice Parker of Massachusetts, a party cannot have a
vested right to do wrong; or as stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
"laws curing defects which would otherwise operate to frustrate what must be
presumed to be the desire of the party affected, cannot be considered as tak-
ing away vested rights. Courts do not regard rights as vested contrary to the
221. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 370.
222. Id. at 377-78 (citations omitted).
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justice and equity of the case. 223
Despite his not recognizing a general property right in de-
fenses established by the standing law, Cooley employed an alter-
native rubric under which some defenses not embodied in tradi-
tional "property" might be held to create vested rights. Like
Harlan and Bradley, he argued that a party released from paying a
debt by the operation of the statute of limitations had a vested
right not to respond in damages:
As to the circumstances under which a man may be said to have a vested
right to a defense, it is somewhat difficult to lay down a comprehensive rule.
He who has satisfied a demand cannot have it revived against him, and he
who has become released from a demand by the operation of the statute of
limitations is equally protected. In both cases the right is gone, and to restore
it would be to create a new contract for the parties-a thing quite beyond the
power of legislation. 24
The expansion of the concept of property to include any legal
interest and the idea that "the impairment of a contract may con-
sist in increasing its burdens as well as in diminishing its effi-
ciency" thus developed together.225 Both were ways of protecting
what Hohfeld would later describe as privileges despite the ab-
sence of a legal "thing." The remaining step was to generalize from
Cooley's argument that some defenses created vested rights to the
argument that all defenses were equally vested from the stand-
point of legal logic. With the passage of the fourteenth amendment
and a general federal question jurisdiction statute, one route to
this end involved the inclusion of "incorporeal" privileges into the
constitutional definition of property.2 26 Thus Holmes stated:
223. Id. at 378 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
225. Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236, 251 (1923) (Suth-
erland, J.).
226. The enactment of the fourteenth amendment and a general federal question juris-
dictional statute were held to federalize entirely the vested rights doctrine. See, e.g., C.J.
Waite's opinion in Peik v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877). Thompson later wrote:
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion, it was the sound doctrine that the Federal Constitution did not prohibit
the States from divesting vested rights unless those rights were vested by
contract.
... The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution... did not apply to
the State governments, but was merely a restraint upon the agencies of the Fed-
eral Government. But the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States has changed all this by ordaining "Nor shall any state ... deprive
[Vol. 31
1982] CONTRACT CLAUSE INTERPRETATIONS
In Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, in which it was held by a majority of the
court that a repeal of the statute of limitations as to debts already barred
violated no rights of the debtor under the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Justice
Miller speaks as if the constitutional right relied on were a right to defeat a
just debt. But the constitutional right asserted was the same that would be
set up if the Legislature should order one citizen to pay a sum of money to
another with whom he had been in no previous relations of any kind. Such a
repeal requires the property of one person to be given to another when there
was no previous enforceable legal obligation to give it. Whether the freedom
of the defendant from liability is due to a technicality or to his having had no
dealings with the other party, he is equally free, and it would seem logical to
say that if the Constitution protects him in one case it protects him in all.
2 27
An alternative route to the same end, for legal interests treated as
"contractual," was the doctrine that a statute enlarging the obliga-
tion of a contract was as much a violation of the contract clause as
one diminishing the obligation.
The abstraction of the property right thus meant that all
Hohfeldian privileges would be viewed as "property" in their own
right, independent of any connection with a "thing." Under either
the property or contract rubrics, every instance in which a statute
upset an existing defense now presented a hard case of the kind
Cooley had perceived to exist only when the defense was embodied
in a thing. It therefore seemed to a new generation of legal think-
ers that the doctrine of "no vested right to do wrong" captured the
sense in which the protection of any entitlement as vested necessa-
rily required a judgment about the substance of the entitlement
asserted. No longer able to use the classification "property" to ex-
clude or disfavor certain entitlements defined by existing rules, the
legal elite recast the "curative act" cases as those in which it
seemed ieasonable or fair to permit the legislature to make "small
repairs":
[I]n this case, as in others, the prevailing judgment of the profession has re-
volted at the attempt to place immunities which exist only by reason of some
slight technical defect on absolutely the same footing as those which stand on
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
S. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 79. Although there was no case explicitly announcing the
federalization of the entire vested rights doctrine, this appears to be the perceived signifi-
cance of the rate cases decided in 1877. These included Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877),
in which jurisdiction was maintained despite the absence of a contract clause claim. The
others were Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877); Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Blake,
94 U.S. 180 (1877); Peik v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877).
227. Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N.E. 1033, 1033 (1901).
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fundamental grounds. Perhaps the reasoning of the cases has not always been
as sound as the instinct which directed the decisions. It may be that some-
times it would have been as well not to attempt to make out that the judg-
ment of the court was consistent with constitutional rules, if such rules were
to be taken to have the exactness of mathematics.
.. . But however that may be, multitudes of cases have recognized the
power of the Legislature to call a liability into being where there was none
before, if the circumstances were such as to appeal with some strength to the
prevailing views of justice, and if the obstacle in the way of creation seemed
small.
228
B. Rights and Remedies
From the start of Constitutional protection for vested rights,
the Court observed that extending protection to "remedies" as well
as "rights" would have restricted the legislature's "exercise of its
legitimate powers [to regulate] the . . . mode of proceeding in its
courts.122 9 On the other hand, the Court also argued that a statute
228. Id. at 476-77, 59 N.E. at 1033-34.
229. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 349 (1827) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The early discussion of whether the contract clause protected remedies as well as rights was
perceived to have implications for federalism as well as for the constitutional protection of
individual rights. In agreeing with Marshall that "[I]f the remedy enters into the contract,
then the states lose all power to alter their laws for the administration of justice," Johnson
argued that the failure to distinguish between contract rights and remedies would under-
mine the conflicts rule that courts should apply lex fori to remedial or procedural matters
and lex loci contractus to matters of substantive right. "The law of the contract remains the
same everywhere,. . . but the remedy necessarily varies with relation to the laws of distrib-
utive justice known to the policy of each state severally." The logical link perceived between
the right/remedy distinction for purposes of determining which rights were vested and
which were required to be enforced by a court situated in a state in which the contract was
not made provides another example of the reification of rights as physical things. Conceiving
a debt as a thing which either "existed" or did not, the Court in Campbell v. Holt cited the
cases in which the conflicts rule had been applied so as to give a party the benefit of the
statute of limitations of the forum state as evidence that his right to recover the debt was
not extinguished by the running of the statute of limitations in the state in which the con-
tract was made. 115 U.S. at 625-27. The dissenters, not conceiving the right as a thing, could
not understand the logical connection between the conflicts rule and constitutional cases:
It is said that the statutory defence acquired and perfected in one State or coun-
try is not, or may not be, a good defence in another. This, if it were true, proves
nothing to the purpose. It is a vested right in the place where it has accrued, and
is an absolute bar to the action there. This is a valuable right, although it may
be ineffective elsewhere.
Id. at 631 (Bradley and Harlan, J.J., dissenting).
This argument was taken to its conclusion in Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933). He argued that the line between "rights" and
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altering a remedy could extinguish an existing right no less than
one which acted "directly" on the right. For example, Justice Story
in Green v. Biddle noted:
It is no answer, that the acts ... now in question are regulations of the rem-
edy, and not of the right to lands. If those acts so change the nature and
extent of existing remedies, so as materially to impair the rights and interests
of the owner, they are just as much a violation of the compact as if they
directly overturned his rights and interests.
2 30
Similarly, in the rehearing in Green v. Biddle Justice Washington
wrote:
[A] law which denies to the owner of land a remedy to recover possession of it
* . . or which clogs his recovery of such possession and profits, by conditions
and restrictions tending to diminish the value and amount of the thing recov-
ered, impairs his right to, and interest in, the property.
21
Nonetheless, the Court's hesitation in Ogden to decide whether the
contract clause protected remedies as well as rights ended in Ma-
son v. Heile, where it upheld a legislative discharge of a debtor
from prison on the ground that "[s]uch laws act merely upon the
remedy, and that in part only. ' 23 2 Thus, while hesitating to hold
that all remedial changes were necessarily permissible, the Court
accepted Marshall's notion that "the distinction between the obli-
gation of a contract, and the remedy . . . exists in the nature of
"remedies" or "substance" and "procedure" in contract clause and conflicts doctrine could
be drawn only by reference to the different purposes of each doctrine. See also, Clark, supra
note 215, at 96.
230. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1823).
231. Id. at 75-76 (1823). The statements in Green v. Biddle, however, are subject to a
qualification. There, the contract bringing the case within the contract clause was a compact
by which Kentucky (formed out of territory belonging to Virginia) agreed to determine by
the then existing laws of Virginia all "private rights and interests of lands... derived from
the laws of Virginia." Id. A Virginia claimant sued in ejectment to recover possession from a
Kentucky occupant. Since ejectment at common law was viewed as a "local" action, venue
would have not have existed in a state other than Kentucky. In this respect, ejectment was
different from actions ex contractu which were viewed at common law as "transitory" ac-
tions that could be brought outside the locality whose law governed the claim. Hence, the
logical inconsistency felt to exist between holding that contract remedies "vested" and that
a forum state could apply its own remedial law would not have been felt in Green v. Biddle,
where, under existing venue practice, there was no possibility for the claim to be brought in
another state. This might explain why, until the end of the nineteenth century, the Court
did not see as supported by the same reasoning the arguments that "a law which affects the
remedy for the recovery of land impairs the right to the land" and that "a law which affects
the remedy for enforcement of a contract ... impair[s] the obligation of that contract."
Hale, supra note 1, at 538.
232. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370, 378 (1827).
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things," and that therefore remedies were not protected in the
same way as were rights.23
In Bronson v. Kinzie,3 4 the Court voided a law expressly ac-
knowledged as altering the remedies available for enforcing ex-
isting contracts. It was, however, careful to note that not all
changes in remedial laws affecting existing contracts were void:
If the laws of the state passed afterwards had done nothing more than change
the remedy upon contracts of this description, they would be liable to no
constitutional objection. For, undoubtedly, a state may regulate at pleasure
the modes of proceeding in its courts in relation to past contracts as well as
future.2 35
Rather than equate remedies with rights, the Court argued that
some remedial changes may, "in effect," destroy rights by taking
"away all remedy to enforce them, or encumber[ing them] with
conditions that rendered [them] useless or impracticable to
pursue:"2 3
Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will
of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the
contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by
acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself.237
Remedies were thus not necessarily protected (as were vested
rights), but in particular cases a change in the remedy might be
held to impair a right where the change made enforcement of the
right impossible or difficult.
Cooley rationalized the cases by classifying statutes acting
only on the remedy into a hierarchy of sorts; he argued that one
had no vested right to a particular remedy, except in "those pecu-
liar cases where the remedy is a part of the right itself.' 238 These
were the contract clause cases where "it is evident that substantive
rights were affected" or where, when "the laws. . . operated upon
the remedy, they either had an effect equivalent to importing some
new stipulation into the contract, or they failed to leave the party
a substantial remedy. '239 Cooley then discussed under separate
233. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200-01 (1819).
234. 43 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
235. Id. at 315.
236. Id. at 317.
237. Id. at 316.
238. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 361 (citations omitted).
239. Id. at 292-93.
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headings limitation laws and laws altering the rules of evidence.
The latter were so "separate" from rights, Cooley argued, that they
might be applied to existing "causes of action, even in those States
where retrospective laws are forbidden" because "the law as
changed would only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in
legal controversies in the future. '240 Changes in statutes of limita-
tions as to existing causes of action were generally only remedial
(so long as a reasonable time was permitted for the party to bring
suit), but a statute reviving a time-barred claim to property ap-
peared to go beyond the remedy so as to infringe a right: "The
right being gone, of course the remedy fell with it; and as there
could be no remedy without a corresponding right, it was useless
for the legislature to restore the former, so long as it was prohib-
ited by the constitution from interfering or meddling with the
latter. ,241
The breakdown of the right/remedy distinction was reflected
in the increasing criticism of the meaningfulness of the distinction
in each of these contexts. CoQley's concession, for example, that in
some cases the "remedy was part of the right"2 42 appeared to be a
response to cases such as Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy.243 There
the Court overruled a federal circuit court's denial of a writ of
mandamus ordering the city to levy a tax sufficient to pay interest
on previously issued bonds, despite a statute forbidding cities to
tax above a certain rate to pay off the bonds. Justice Swayne, for
the Court, thought the case illustrated the distinction between
rights and remedies to be "one rather of form than substance. '244
Sedgwick also had attacked the right/remedy distinction as
employed in the contract clause cases:
Notwithstanding the great weight of authority on the other side of the ques-
tion, I am free to confess my entire inability to distinguish between the obli-
gation and the remedy of a contract. . . . What, then, is in legal acceptation,
the binding force of a contract? It certainly is not the mere, naked promise. It
is not the moral duty. It is not the honor, nor fashion, that binds the con-
240. Id. at 367. Cooley then qualified this rule by noting that "under pretext of regulat-
ing evidence" a statute could not constitutionally "altogether preclude a party from exhibit-
ing his rights," and then further qualified this by noting an exception for "cases which fall
within the familiar doctrine of equitable estoppel at common law." Id. at 368.
241. Id. at 365 (quoting Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wisc. 274, 278 (1860)).
242. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 361.
243. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867).
244. Id. at 554.
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tracting party to keep his engagement. What is it then, but the remedy-the
coercive remedy-which the law gives against the person or property of the
defaulting party. . . . Take away the whole remedy, and it is admitted the
contract is gone. How, then, if a material part of the remedy be taken away,
can it be said that the obligation is not impaired?24 '
But Sedgwick was not willing to extend the argument to the entire
body of rules that might be classified as remedial. He seemed to
exclude laws modifying only "procedure:" "No one seeks to deny
that the remedy should be to a certain extent under legislative
control. Tribunals may be changed, procedure altered: these modi-
fications do in no wise impair the remedy or prejudice the holder
of a contract."246
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, however, pressed an ex-
plicit attack on the meaningfulness bf the distinction in all con-
texts in Kent v. Gray.247 In Kent, three persons brought an action
in debt against a single defendant. It was decided, on demurrer,
that an existing statute authorized the action to be brought by one
person only. Shortly thereafter, the New Hampshire legislature
passed a law, which in terms appliead to existing suits, providing
that "when two or more are joined as plaintiffs, the writ ... may
be amended by striking out the name of any plaintiff before the
evidence is closed, or the case is submitted. '245 The plaintiffs
moved to amend their writ, and their attempt to do so was chal-
lenged as violative of the New Hampshire constitutional provision
prohibiting the legislature from passing retrospective laws, which
that document proclaimed to be "highly injurious, oppressive, and
unjust. '2 49
Cooley had used Rich v. Flanders,250 a previous decision inter-
preting the New Hampshire prohibition of retrospective laws, to
demonstrate that changes in the rules of evidence applied to ex-
isting causes of action not only did not divest vested rights, but
were not even considered as retrospective. In Rich, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court had approved for application to ex-
isting causes of action a statute removing the common law disqual-
ification of interested witnesses. Although recognizing that the
245. T. SEDGWICK, supra note 83, at 630.
246. Id.
247. 53 N.H. 576 (1873).
248. Chapter 39 of Laws of 1872.
249. 53 N.H. at 576.
250. 39 N.H. 304 (1859).
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change might alter the outcome of suits on existing causes of ac-
tion, the Court, citing cases distinguishing vested rights from rem-
edies, concluded that "statutes affecting the remedy, though in fact
retroactive, are not considered retrospective in the legal sense of
that word."'251 It supported its decision with numerous quotations
approving the exercise of legislative power over the rules of evi-
dence and modes of proceeding in the courts. 52
Justice Doe, who had joined the Court's decision in Rich, now
wrote an opinion in Kent v. Gray declaring unconstitutional the
application of the law permitting the amendment of writs to ex-
isting causes. 253 He rejected completely the distinction between
rights and remedies by denying that it helped resolve the conflict
between legislative power and vested rights in any of the contexts
in which it had been employed:
The principles of justice, declared by the prohibition of retrospective laws,
are not evaded by words, names, and pretences. And when we have merely
ascertained that a statute affects the remedy in some sense or other, we have
made very little progress in the inquiry whether it affects a right, that is,
whether it is unjust on general principles. If a certain change be made in the
remedy, it is because it can be justly made: if a change cannot be made in the
right, it is because it cannot be justly made.2 '
Understanding the categories to reproduce rather than resolve the
problem, Doe recast the notion of retrospective legislation around
the idea of "substantial equity. 21 5 His first target was Cooley's
discussion of alterations in the rules of evidence:
There is much authority for holding, in general terms, that a right to have
one's controversies determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested
right .... But general statements of this kind are to be taken with the broad
qualification that the changes must not infringe the general principles of
justice. 51
Giving an example of a law abolishing "the action of assumpsit,
and substituting for it the action of debt," Doe also questioned
whether the right/remedy distinction helped in deciding a "core"
251. Id. at 319.
252. Id. at 316-17, 323-27.
253. 53 N.H. 576 (1873).
254. Id. at 579.
255. Doe offered two pages of reasons why, taking the prohibition against retrospective
legislation "in the reasonable and equitable sense," an argument "might be made, in support
of the doctrine of Rich v. Flanders, on very narrow ground." Id. at 576-78.
256. Id. at 578-79.
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case involving the extent of the legislature's power over the modes
of proceeding in the courts:
[I]t is not apparent how the constitutional sense, in such a case, would be
elucidated by a distinction between a right and a remedy. The injustice
would be manifest; and the test given by the bill of rights is, not the distinc-
tion between right and remedy, but the distinction between right and
wrong-2 5
7
Finally, he attempted to use Cooley to his purpose by generalizing
from the section on the vesting of defenses, where Cooley had rec-
ognized the existence of a few hard cases which could be decided
only by direct resort to equitable principles:
On other subjects, the ground of judicial decision is not ordinarily understood
to be so broad as the general principles of justice: but, on this subject of
retrospective legislation, those principles are the constitutional ground amply
supported by the authorities. It is said that a defendant has no vested right
in a defence based upon an informality not affecting his substantial equities,
and that formal defects and irregularities may be cured by retrospective legis-
lation. That is merely saying that the whole subject stands on the ground of
substantial equity. What are formal and what are substantial defects in par-
ticular cases, may not be an easier problem than the application of the gen-
eral equitable principle. 258
As of 1873, however, the critique of the meaningfulness of the
right/remedy distinction appears to have proceeded further in a
state such as New Hampshire, where all retrospective legislation
was prohibited,2 59 than in the state or federal cases where the pro-
tection of vested rights was expressly linked to the protection of
"property" interests. In those cases, it remained possible to argue
that the interest upset by a retrospective alteration of a remedy
was not a property interest and hence not a vested right. As the
concept of property was expanded to include all legal interests,
however, it became both more necessary and less persuasive to rely
on the right/remedy distinction to determine which interests de-
fined by the standing law vested.
In Campbell v. Holt,260 for example, the Court distinguished
the state cases voiding statutes reviving time-barred debts as based
on those states' constitutional prohibition of retrospective legisla-
257. Id. at 579-80.
258. Id. at 580 (citations omitted).
259. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. vol. 1 (1970).
260. 115 U.S. 620, 625 (1885).
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tion. In addition to arguing that the defendant had no property in
the bar of the statute, the Court argued that the extension of the
limitations period affected only a remedy:
There are numerous cases where a contract incapable of enforcement for
want of a remedy, can be so aided by legislation as to become the proper
ground of a valid action....
In all this class of cases the ground taken is, that there exists a contract,
but, by reason of no remedy having been provided for its enforcement, or the
remedy ordinarily applicable to that class having, for reasons of public policy
been forbidden or withheld, the legislature, by providing a remedy where
none exists, or removing the statutory obstruction to the use of the remedy,
enables the party to enforce the contract, otherwise unobjectionable 2 61
But the dissenters, conceiving property as any valuable interest,
could not understand why a defendant's right to his remedy was
any less valuable than a plaintiff's right to his, which the Court
had previously protected when striking down changes in remedial
laws whose effect was to impair a right:
The fact that this defence pertains to the remedy does not alter the case.
Remedies are the life of rights, and are equally protected by the Constitution.
Deprivation of a remedy is equivalent to a deprivation of the right which it is
intended to vindicate, unless another remedy exists or is substituted for that
which is taken away. This court has frequently held that to deprive a man of
remedy for enforcing a contract is itself a mode of impairing the validity of
the contract. And, as before said, the right of defence is just as valuable as
the right of action. It is the defendant's remedy. There is really no difference
between the one right and the other in this respect.2
8 2
The expansion of the concept of property thus produced in the
state and federal cases, where the protection of vested rights was
linked to the possession of "property," the same critique of the
distinction between "rights" and "remedies" developed earlier in
the states where all retrospective legislation was prohibited. Inso-
far as any law that changed an existing legal relation, whether
called a law altering a right or a remedy, impacted on the value of
that relation, it was now viewed as having authorized the appropri-
ation of a party's property. Hence in Danforth v. Groton Water
Co., a case in which the Massachusetts legislature applied to ex-
isting causes of action a law altering the procedural requirements
for recovering damages incurred in the exercise of the power of em-
261. Id. at 627.
262. Id. at 631 (Bradley and Harland, JJ., dissenting).
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inent domain, the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted that the
"distinction between the remedy and substantive right" did not al-
ter the fact that the procedural change amounted to "requir[ing]
the property of one person to be given to another when there was
no previously enforceable legal obligation to give it. ' 263 The right/
remedy distinction was there reconceived as a "device" to prevent
"a written constitution from interfering with the power to make
small repairs which a legislature naturally possesses. 264 Similarly,
in Dunbar v. Boston & Providence Railroad, that same court said
with respect to a statute extending the limitations period on cer-
tain causes of action:
However much you may disguise or palliate the change by saying that the
statute deals only with the remedy, or that a party has no vested right to a
merely technical defence, or by adopting any other cloudy phrase that keeps
the light from the fact, such legislation does enact that the property of a
person previously free from legal liability shall be given to another who
before the statute had no legal claim.28 5
The court in Dunbar, like the court in Kent, ultimately recast the
idea of protecting existing entitlements against retrospective alter-
ation as a matter of doing substantial justice: "[W]here .. .we
cannot say that the Legislature with its larger view of the facts
may not have been satisfied that substantial justice required its
action, we are not prepared to pronounce the statute unconstitu-
tional in the face of the most authoritative decisions. '26 6
The collapse of the logic of vested rights can thus be under-
stood as the demise in the meaningfulness of the boundary doc-
trines which made plausible the belief that judicial review of
vested rights required review only of the "manner" in which the
legislature had acted and not the substance of its action. At the
core of this logic were the distinctions between property and ex-
pectant interests and rights and remedies. In what might be de-
scribed as an intermediate "ring" surrounding the core, were the
various qualifying doctrines holding, for example, that a law "sub-
stantially" impairing a remedy divested a right and that a defense
did not vest unless it affected a party's "substantial" interests. In
the periphery, but only the periphery, were the doctrines such as
263. 178 Mass. 472, 476-77, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1901).
264. Id. at 477, 59 N.E. at 1034.
265. 181 Mass. 383, 385, 63 N.E. 916 (1902).
266. Id. at 386, 63 N.E. at 917.
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"no vested right to do wrong," which acknowledged that a few
hard cases could be resolved only by reference to "substantial
equity."
Cooley presented all this as the natural extension of the judici-
ary's function in applying the standing law so as to protect individ-
ual rights.267 But as the critique of the meaningfulness of the core
distinctions accumulated, the doctrines once applicable only in the
periphery became increasingly relied upon to resolve the cases.
The reconceptualization of the legal concept of property to include
any valuable legal interest and the reconceptualization of a legal
right as an entitlement "to enforce against another a claim, or to
resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another"6 8 made it in-
creasingly evident that in order to distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate exercises of legislative power, the courts would
have to consider the substance of the entitlement claimed under
prior law and the reasonableness of the challenged exercise of leg-
islative power. The periphery came to engulf the core, and, short of
freezing the existing law and disabling entirely legislative power,
the protection of vested rights would now be viewed as incorporat-
ing a judgment about the substance of legislative power and indi-
vidual right.
IV. THE TRANSITION FROM VESTED TO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
Against the backdrop provided by the erosion of the concep-
tual underpinnings of the logic of vested rights, it is possible to
return with greater understanding to the late nineteenth century
contract clause cases. The decisions undermining the doctrinal
handiwork of the Marshall Court appear to be part of the process
by which the late nineteenth century legal elite came to view the
earlier doctrines as devices for judging the substance of individual
rights and legislative power. One response was to free legislative
power to upset some entitlements previously protected as vested
rights and to protect others only to the extent that such protection
was viewed as reasonable. A second was to recast individual con-
tract and property rights as substantive rights against the state.
267. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 357-58.
268. Smith, supra note 185, at 243 (quoting Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37,
45, 3 S.W. 249, 253 (1887)).
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A. Unraveling Contract Clause Doctrine
In the analysis of the early contract clause cases, much atten-
tion has been directed to the Court's creativity in finding a con-
tract in a land grant or corporate charter. As argued above, how-
ever, the distinct importance of the contract rubric was in
establishing federal jurisdiction over certain vested rights. Neither
Marshall nor Cooley, for example, thought that the determination
that some governmental actions created contracts with individuals
provided an intelligible boundary between individual rights and
legislative power. The notion was simply too broad. Cooley put the
point as follows: "[M]any things done by the State may seem to
hold out promises to individuals, which after all cannot be treated
as contracts without hampering the legislative power of the State
in a manner that would soon leave it without the means of per-
forming its essential functions."26 9 Marshall made the same point
in Dartmouth College:
[I]s [sic] has been argued, that the word "contract," in its broadest sense,
would comprehend the political relations between the government and its cit-
izens, would extend to offices held within a state, for state purposes, and to
many of those laws concerning civil institutions, which must change with cir-
cumstances, and be modified by ordinary legislation; which deeply concern
the public, and which, to preserve good government, the public judgment
must control
The general correctness of these observations cannot be controverted.2 "
The boundary doctrines actually utilized to decide the cases
were therefore those discussed in the previous section. Of particu-
lar importance in the "legislative contract" cases was whether the
interest claimed to have vested was conceived as "property." In
Fletcher v. Peck, for example, Marshall distinguished instances in
which a legislature could repeal an act of an earlier legislature from
those in which it could not, according to whether the earlier act
was "general legislation" or a conveyance "vesting a legal es-
tate. '27 1 Johnson distinguished between acts concerning the "pow-
ers" and those concerning the "interests or property" of a nation,
and argued that only the latter could create rights vested in indi-
269. T.M. CooLEY, supra note 46, at 276.
270. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627, 629 (1819).
271. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
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viduals.7 2 Similarly, Marshall concluded in Dartmouth College
that:
[the] term "contract" must be understood in a more limited sense ... to
restrain the legislature in future [sic] from violating the right to property.
The provision of the constitution never has been understood to embrace
other contracts than those which respect property, or some object of value,
and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice.273
Finally, Justice Daniel, later sustaining for the Court a statute di-
minishing the compensation and term of office of public officers
noted: "The contracts designed to be protected by the [contract
clause] are contracts by which perfect rights, certain definite,
fixed private rights of property, are vested. '274
From this perspective, it is possible to see why Fletcher
presented a relatively easy case, and why Marshall could refer to
the "vesting" of the land as a matter of "fact." Since the right
claimed in that case was embodied in real property, there was little
dispute over whether it had vested. Roughly similar is Terret v.
Taylor,7 5 in which the legislature of Virginia, by repeal of an act
confirming to the Episcopal Church title in glebe lands, sought to
"vest the property of such corporations in the state, or dispose of
same to such purposes as it. . .please. ' 278 Far more difficult, how-
ever, was Dartmouth College itself.
The issue which appears to have presented the most vexing
legal problem to the Court was whether the statute amending the
charter of the college might be said to have divested someone of
his legal property. The analytic problem with categorizing a corpo-
rate franchise was that it was both a grant of certain legal interests
themselves difficult to classify as property as well as an authority
for the corporation to hold and acquire traditional property inter-
ests. Marshall thought the most difficult question was whether the
amendment of the charter interfered with anyone's beneficial in-
terest in the corporate property. The "founders of the college" and
the "donors of land" were "equally without interest," since they
"have parted with the property bestowed upon [the corpora-
272. Id. at 143.
273. 17 U.S. at 629.
274. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 57 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416 (1851) (emphasis in original).
275. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815).
276. Cf. Turpin v. Lockett, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113 (1804).
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tion.] 217 7 Similarly, "the students are fluctuating, and no individ-
ual among our youth has a vested interest in the institution."'2 8
Finally, "the trustees, in whom the rights of all were combined,
possessed no private individual beneficial interest in the property
confided to their protection. '27 9
Marshall acknowledged that in England, this argument would
be dispositive "[h]ad parliament, immediately after the emanation
of this charter, . . . annulled the instrument. '"28 0 But he continued,
by a kind of process of elimination, to argue that the situation was
different in America with respect to "these eleemosynary institu-
tions" which "do not fill the place, which would otherwise be occu-
pied by government, but that which would otherwise remain va-
cant."28 Marshall seems to be saying that wherever the beneficial
interest in the corporation's property lay, it was not located in the
government, in a case where the "donors and founders" had given
their property for "the benefit of religion and literature. '" 2 2 The
"body corporate therefore possess[ed] the whole legal and equita-
ble interest [and] completely represent[ed] the donors, for the pur-
pose of executing the trust ... [and] has rights which are pro-
tected by the constitution."28 3 Moreover, Marshall argued that
since the trustees could, under the charter, appoint themselves to
posts within the college, they might be said to possess a "beneficial
interest" not entirely "unconnected" to their "freehold right in the
powers confided to them.P284
In a concurring opinion, Washington took a somewhat differ-
ent tack, arguing that the corporate franchise itself was a species of
property. Citing Blackstone, he noted:
This franchise, like other franchises, is an incorporeal hereditament, issuing
out of something real or personal, or concerning or annexed to, and exercisa-
ble within a thing corporate.
... The subjects of the grant are not only privileges and immunities, but
property, or, which is the same thing, a capacity to acquire and to hold prop-
277. 17 U.S. at 641.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 643.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 647.
282. Id. at 653.
283. Id. at 654.
284. Id.
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erty in perpetuity.28 5
But holding the franchise "property" did not entirely resolve the
case, since Washington agreed that the "trustees or governors" of a
"civil" corporation would "have no interest" that would be violated
by amendment or repeal of a charter "accepted. . . for the public
benefit alone.' "86 Hence Washington also argued that it was the
private nature of the corporate purpose which determined that the
property possessed by the corporation was vested: "With such a
[private] corporation, it is not competent for the legislature to in-
terfere. It is a franchise, or incorporeal hereditament, founded
upon private property.. . . [AIll of these powers, rights and privi-
leges, flow from the property of the founder in the funds assigned
for the support of the charity. '287
Story argued similarly to Washington that the corporate
franchise was itself a species of property, finding that "a grant of
franchises is not, in point of principle, distinguishable from a grant
of any other property. ' 288 To the objection that "no grants are
within the constitutional prohibition, except such as respect prop-
erty in the strict sense of the term; that is to say, beneficial inter-
ests in lands, tenements, and hereditaments . . . which may be
sold by the grantees for their own benefit, ' 289 Story responded:
"There are many rights, franchises and authorities which are valu-
able in contemplation of law, where no beneficial interest can ac-
crue to the possessor. '29 0 Analogizing the franchise to an avow-
sdon, an incorporeal hereditament "which cannot be legally sold to
the intended incumbered," Story concluded: "The truth, however,
is that all incorporeal hereditaments, whether they be immunities,
dignities, offices, or franchises, or other rights, are deemed valuable
in law. The owners have a legal estate and property in them. 2 9 1 In
addition, Story argued that "whatever may be thought as to the
corporators, it cannot be denied that the corporation itself has a
legal interest in [the corporate franchise] . . . . [C]orporate
franchises . . . are, properly speaking, legal estates vested in the
285. Id. at 657-58.
286. Id. at 661.
287. Id. at 661-62.
288. Id. at 684.
289. Id. at 698.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 699.
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corporation itself as soon as it is in esse. They are not mere naked
powers . . . but powers coupled with an interest. The property of
the corporation vests upon the possession of its franchises
"292
The private corporate franchise thus represented the most
self-consciously "abstract" form of property held to vest in individ-
uals. Legal interests not classifiable as traditional property seemed
to become so by virtue of their embodiment in a corporate
franchise. Equating a franchise and the interests created thereby
with any other thing "deemed valuable in law"29 3 came close to
acknowledging that individuals may be said to have property in all
their rights, a conception whose implications were later to contrib-
ute to the demise of the logic of vested rights. Washington's equa-
tion, for instance, of property with "a capacity to acquire and hold
property in perpetuity" 294 could have undermined Ogden itself.
The bankruptcy act, although applicable only to subsequent con-
tracts, would have divested an existing property right if the credi-
tor's power to acquire and hold property (defined by the standing
law prior to the enactment of the bankruptcy act) was itself con-
ceived as property.
The interests created by a private corporate franchise thus oc-
cupied a unique and problematic place in the regime of vested
rights. Although conceiving of the franchise of a private corpora-
tion as property, Story acknowledged that in England the King
could reserve a power "to alter or amend the charter, or devest the
corporation of its franchises. 2 95 This acknowledgement high-
lighted the problematic character of holding that the franchise of a
private corporation was property and hence protecting as vested
rights all legal interests defined by the charter.96 Unlike other
vested property interests, rights granted by franchise were subject
to alteration, amendment, and repeal where the power to do so was
reserved. Cooley later rationalized the rule this way:
Those charters of incorporation, however, which are granted, not as a part of
the machinery of the government, but for the private benefit or purposes of
292. Id. at 700 (emphasis deleted).
293. Id. at 699.
294. Id. at 657-58.
295. Id. at 675.
296. To the doctrine of reserved powers might be added that pertaining to the "strict
construction" of corporate charters.
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the corporators, are held to be contracts between the legislature and the cor-
porators, based, for their consideration, on the liabilities and duties which the
corporators assume by accepting them; and the grant of the franchise can no
more be resumed by the legislature, or its benefits diminished or impaired
without the consent of the grantees, than any other grant of property or valu-
able thing, unless the right to do so is reserved in the charter itself.2
Where the power of repeal was reserved, however, the franchise
itself "must be regarded as a mere privilege while it continues, and
the legislature may recall it at any time, without affording any
ground to claim redress."2 98
Of similar effect to the doctrine of reserved powers was the
limitation on the legal interests that might vest by government
grant derived from the idea that the legislature was not competent
to "so bind up its own hands by a grant as to preclude it from
exercising for the future any of the essential attributes of sover-
eignty in regard to any of the subjects within its jurisdiction. '299 In
West River Bridge v. Dix,300 for example, the Court permitted the
taking of a bridge for a public highway despite the claim that the
condemnation impaired the rights of the bridge owners under their
charter. Arguing that the future exercise of the power of eminent
domain was "implied" in every grant, the Court held that the cor-
poration's chartered rights were no more protected from condem-
nation than any other property. 0 1 Also, in a series of cases begin-
ning in the early 1850's, a number of Justices, although never a
majority, objected to protecting tax exemptions granted to corpo-
rations as vested rights on the ground that such protection permit-
ted the legislature to "bargain away" its taxing power.02 Finally,
the Court upheld legislation revoking a license to conduct a lot-
tery, 303 a charter permitting the manufacture of liquor,3 4 and a
franchise to operate a factory at a particular location, 05 on the
297. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 279 (citations omitted).
298. Id. at 383-84.
299. Id. at 280.
300. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
301. Id. at 53r-133.
302. Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869); Dodge v. Woolsey,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855); Ohio Life Ins & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416
(1853); Picqua v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853).
303. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880). Cf. Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645
(1877)(conducting lottery in violation of statute).
304. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878).
305. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
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ground that the legislature could not bargain away its police
power.
Cooley classified these federal cases and their state court ana-
logs under a rule prohibiting the legislature from surrendering its
inalienable powers of eminent domain, taxation, and police, imme-
diately after discussing private corporate franchises as "prop-
erty. 308 Like the doctrine of reserved powers, the dbctrine of "ina-
lienable sovereign powers" was applied to limit the vesting of
rights granted by legislative enactment which, but for their embod-
iment in a private corporate franchise, would not have been pro-
tected as property. Protecting the franchise itself as property per-
mitted the vesting in corporations of legal interests more
"abstract" than those which could vest in individuals.
Nothing, however, in the early application of either the doc-
trine of reserved powers or inalienable sovereign powers, which
constituted the legal terrain on which the battle over corporate
privileges was fought, undermined the concept of vested rights. In
the application of reservation clauses, for example, the Court con-
sistently noted that such clauses did not permit the legislature to
impair a contract made between a corporation and a third party or
to divest the corporation of property vested in the exercise of the
powers granted by the charter.30 7 Similarly, nothing in the early
application of the doctrine of the inalienable police power indi-
cated that the Court would use it to hold as "non-vested" those
rights which represented less controversial forms of property than
a corporate charter.308 In fact, when the Court held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment federalized entirely
the vested rights doctrine, it noted that its effect was to put corpo-
rations and individuals on the same footing under the law, a signal
306. T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 280-84.
307. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1879); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319 (1877); Hol-
yoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500 (1873); Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478
(1873); Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 454 (1873); Pennsylvania College Cases, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 190 (1872).
308. For example, the Court in Beer Co., 97 U.S. at 32, noted that it was not applying
the doctrine to divest "property actually in existence." It implied that liquor already manu-
factured under the charter would have become vested in the corporation. Similarly, Cooley,
in his chapter on the police power, noted that "even a provision in a corporate charter,
empowering the legislature to alter, modify, or repeal it, would not authorize a subsequent
act which, on pretence of amendment, or a police regulation, would have the effect to appro-
priate a portion of the corporate property to the public use." T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at
578 (citations omitted).
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that the boundary doctrines that would be applied to corporate in-
terests would be the same as those applied to individuals.30 9
The irony of the Court's resolution of the problem of how to
treat the vested rights of corporations through reliance on the
traditional concept of property was that it occurred at roughly the
same time as that concept was itself undergoing a transformation.
The doctrines developed to put corporations and individuals on
the same footing under the law achieved widespread acceptance at
the moment at which it was becoming increasingly plausible to
conceive of individuals as having property in all their legal inter-
ests. Thus the reliance on the traditional notion of property to pro-
tect only the choses in action acquired by a corporation in a "con-
tract with a third party" or the "property" acquired by a
corporation in the exercise of its granted powers increasingly did
not help to resolve the cases concerning corporate vested rights
any more than they helped to resolve the cases concerning individ-
uals' vested rights. If the critics of corporate privilege were success-
ful in demonstrating a bias towards corporations in the holding
that all rights created by franchise were property, they were suc-
cessful only at the moment it was becoming more difficult to see
any valuable legal interest as something less than a property inter-
est. Hence, rather than observing a trend towards simply cutting
off vested rights protection for corporate interests other than tradi-
tional property, one can see in the cases a collapse into the review
of the substance of corporate held interests parallel to that which
occurred in the cases of vested rights protection for the interests
held by individuals.
In the cases dealing with tax exemptions, for example, the
Court increasingly relied upon legislative intention to determine
whether a particular exemption had vested. Utilizing some rather
strained interpretations of the wording of the exemption and not-
ing the presence or absence of a reservation clause, the Court
seemed to lurch from protecting the exemption to its fullest extent,
protecting it only to a degree, and not protecting it at all.sl° In one
309. Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319 (1877); Peik v. Chicago & N.W. R.R. Co., 94 U.S. 164
(1877). Cooley argued similarly, that the doctrine of the police power places "charter-con-
tracts" of corporations "upon the same footing with other legal rights and privileges of the
citizen." T.M. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 576-77.
310. See B.F. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 179-94. Wright could see no pattern to the
cases.
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case, a charter provision exempting a railroad from taxation "for
ten years after completion" was held not to apply until the road
was completed-the Court holding that the legislature would have
said "until ten years after completion" had it meant to cover the
period of construction. s1 The dissenters argued that the interpre-
tation made no sense in that the exemption was needed more dur-
ing construction than after its completion. 12 In another case, the
Court protected against repeal a statute completely exempting a
railroad from taxation for twenty-five years and providing that
thereafter, no tax reducing dividends below eight percent would be
laid.31  Four dissenters argued that the exemption applied only for
the first twenty-five years and that the latter provision constituted
merely a "rule of taxation" liable to be changed at legislative dis-
cretion.314 An exemption of "all property. . . owned by the corpo-
ration" was held to protect Northwestern University from taxation
on land leased for income producing purposes, 315 but a similar ex-
emption secured in the same year by the Chicago Seminary ex-
empting "all property. . . owned by the seminary" was held not to
apply to land held for investment and not used for immediate sem-
inary purposes.3 16 As used in the grants, three dissenting justices
thought the term "seminary" synonymous with "corporation. '317
Finally, the Court applied reservation clauses to sustain laws re-
pealing tax exemptions, except where the reservation clause was
contained in a general statute and the particular statute granting
the exemption provided that the reservation clause did not
apply.3 18
The examples might be multiplied, but these few suffice to
show that the examination of legislative intention had come com-
pletely to replace the inquiry into whether the exemption claimed
to be protected against repeal was property, and hence a vested
right. Further, the inquiry into legislative intent itself encountered
many difficulties. After losing on whether the state had any power
at all to "bargain away the right of any succeeding legislature to
311. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R. v. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665 (1886).
312. Id. at 671.
313. Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486 (1894).
314. Id. at 507-08.
315. University v. People, 99 U.S. 309 (1878).
316. Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U.S. 662 (1903).
317. Id. at 680.
318. Gulf Ship Is. R.R. v. Hewes, 183 U.S. 66 (1901).
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levy taxes," Justice Miller expressed doubt as to the intelligibility
of the inquiry into legislative intent:
The difficulty in this class of cases has always been to distinguish what is
intended by the legislature to be an exercise of its ordinary legislative func-
tion in making laws, which, like other laws, are subject to its full control by
future amendments and repeals, from what is intended to become a contract
bbtween the State and other parties....
[The] doubts are increased when the terms of the statute relate to a mat-
ter which is . . . one of exclusive legislative cognizance, and which at the
same time requires money or labor to be expended by individuals or corpora-
tions. In such cases, the legislature may be supposed to be merely exercising
its power of regulating... in which case it could be modified from time to
time as legislative discretion might determine; or it might be a contract...
beyond the power of the State to impair. Statutes... of this dual character
.. . require for their construction a critical examination of their terms, and
of the circumstances under which they are created. 1
Justice Waite was perhaps more forthright in discussing what was
at stake in the "critical examination of ... terms" and the "cir-
cumstances" surrounding the creation of the exemption.320 In es-
sence, Waite wrote, the Court had held that the legislature cannot
"bargain away its whole power of taxation," but that it may "in the
exercise of a reasonable discretion, and for the public good, surren-
der a part of its powers in this particular. 3 21 The flexible and
sometimes surprising approaches taken to the problem of constru-
ing the exemptions in the subsequent cases amounted to case-by-
case review of the substance of the grant and the reasonableness of
the reliance placed upon it in a particular instance.
A similar trend towards review of the substance of rights cre-
ated by corporate franchise in place of the inquiry into whether
the interests thus created were "property" is reflected in the cases
dealing with grants of exclusive franchises. In Butchers' Union Co.
v. Crescent City Co., the Court sustained a provision of the Louisi-
ana Constitution removing the monopolistic features of the char-
ters of all existing corporations other than railroads. 22 The Butch-
ers' Union, whose exclusive franchise had been upheld in the
Slaughterhouse Cases,s25 thereby lost by charter amendment its
319. New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1877).
320. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820-21 (1880).
321. Id. at 820.
322. 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
323. Id.; 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 273 (1869).
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protection from competition. The Court reasoned that although
the Union's franchise had all the earmarks of a contract, the crea-
tion of an irrepealable exclusive franchise was void as an attempt
to bargain away the inalienable police power.32 4 Shortly thereafter,
however, the Court protected against repeal, by the same provision
of the Louisiana Constitution, the exclusive charters of a gas com-
pany and water works.2 5 The Court reasoned that such public ser-
vice corporations could be operated only by public franchise, and
hence the legislature could, in these instances, contract away the
power to adopt subsequently a policy in favor of competition.
The distinction between the chartered rights of public service
and private corporations also seemed to underlie the Court's inter-
pretation of provisions allowing for the fixing of rates. In the Rail-
road Commission Cases the Court said that nothing short of an
express surrender of the power of "declaring what shall be deemed
reasonable" would suffice to protect a railroad, whose charter per-
mitted the fixing of reasonable rates, from subsequent rate regula-
tion by a commission established for that purpose.32 6 The Court
also unanimously upheld a commission order fixing rates below the
maximum permitted in a railroad's charter.2 7 But a similar at-
tempt by a city to reduce the maximum fare permitted in the
franchise of a street railway chartered by a municipality was struck
down. 8 And a charter created by a municipality providing for the
rates to be charged by a public service corporation was also pro-
tected against repeal.3 29 Since most public service companies were
chartered by municipalities, the cases turned on whether the mu-
nicipality was authorized by the state to make such a contract,33 0
and finally whether the contract was in some sense reasonable. As
Justice Sanford put it, it was permissible for a state to authorize a
municipality "to establish by an inviolable contract the rates to be
charged by a public service corporation for a definite term, not
grossly unreasonable in time. '3 31
324. Id. at 750-51.
325. New Orleans Water Works v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885); New Orleans Gas Co. v.
Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885).
326. Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 330 (1886).
327. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174 (1888).
328. Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street Ry., 184 U.S. 368 (1902).
329. St. Cloud Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of St. Cloud, 265 U.S. 352 (1924).
330. See, e.g., Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908).
331. St. Cloud Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of St. Cloud, 265 U.S. at 355.
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The Court, in Pearsall v. Great Northern R.R. Co., reviewed
many of these developments in the analysis of rights granted by
corporate franchise..3 2 At issue was a proposed agreement by which
the Great Northern would assume practical control over the
Northern Pacific, which operated a "parallel or competing line. '333
By its original charter (1856), the Great Northern had been
granted authority to "connect with any railroad running in the
same direction" and "to become part owner or lessee of any rail-
road" in the territory roughly bounded by St. Cloud, Minneapolis,
and present day Duluth. 4 The charter also provided that it "may
be amended by any subsequent legislative assembly" but only in a
manner "not destroying the vested rights of said corporation." 335 A
subsequent amendment (1865) gave it unrestricted authority to
consolidate with any other railroad. 6 Two subsequent acts (1874,
1881) declared it unlawful for a railroad to "consolidate" or in
"iany way control" any other railroad corporation "owning or hav-
ing under its control a parallel or competing line.M337
As analyzed by the Court, the question was whether the un-
restricted power to consolidate and combine granted in 1865 was a
vested right within the meaning of the original charter, and hence
protected against repeal by the acts of 1874 and 1881. In his opin-
ion for the Court, Justice Brown undertook an exhaustive review of
the cases, although conceding "that there are no authorities di-
rectly in point. 33 8 On one side were the cases following Dartmouth
College holding that rights granted by a charter were vested "and
hence that an act of the state legislature altering a charter in any
material respect was unconstitutional and void. 3 39 On the other
were such doctrines as strict construction of legislative grants and
the inalienable police power which Brown noted "show ... the
general trend of opinion in this court upon the subject of corporate
charters and vested rights."4 0
The analytic problem was how to treat "a bare unexecuted
332. 161 U.S. 646 (1896).
333. Id. at 650-52.
334. Id. at 668.
335. Id. at 669.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 652.
338. Id. at 668.
339. Id. at 660.
340. Id. at 664-68.
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power to consolidate with other corporations. "341 Returning to the
basic distinction between a vested right which "has become the
property of some particular person" and an "expectant" right,
Brown noted that it might be a different case "if this arrangement
had been actually made and carried into effect. ' 342 The case would
then concern a right "of property acquired by executed contracts"
or "property legally acquired subsequent to such grant. 34 3 But on
the strength of the corporate franchise cases, Brown noted prece-
dent for protecting "all such rights as are necessary to the full and
complete enjoyment of the original grant. '3 4 4 And more impor-
tantly, Brown was not prepared to rely on the traditional concep-
tion of an "unexecuted power" as reflecting an "expectant" and
not a "property" right. For example, Brown argued that it might
make sense to treat the power to combine with non-competing
roads as a vested right even if it remained unexecuted:
We do not deem it necessary to express an opinion ... whether the legisla-
ture could wholly revoke the power it had given this company to extend its
system by the construction or purchase of branch lines or feeders; since the
possibility of an extension of the road, even to the Pacific coast, may have
had an influence upon persons contemplating the purchase of its stock or
securities, so that a right to do this might be said to have become vested."'
Conceiving as essentially arbitrary the boundary between
"property" and "expectant" interests, Brown's analysis of whether
the power to consolidate with competing roads had vested thus de-
volved into the question of the "reasonableness" of so holding in
the particular case, as did the analysis of tax exemptions, exclusive
franchises, and powers to establish rates. For example, he would
not state that a power to consolidate with competitors could not be
a vested right in an appropriate case: "Perhaps. . . it might not be
beyond the competency of the legislature to authorize a railroad
.. . to consolidate with a parallel or competing line, since cases
may be imagined where it might be for the public welfare to per-
mit such consolidation.13 4 Nor would he say "that the legislature
may not, in the exercise of a wise foresight, and for the purpose of
341. Id.
342. Id. at 672-73.
343. Id. at 673.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 675.
346. Id. at 675-76.
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attracting capital to enterprise of doubtful profit, authorize the
granting of monopolies for a limited time, irrevocable by a subse-
quent legislature. '3 7 But in the context of this case, Brown
summed up: "[W]e think it was competent for the legislature, out
of due regard for the public welfare, to declare that its charter
should not be used for the purpose of stifling competition and
building up monopolies. In short, we cannot recognize a vested
right to do a manifest wrong. ' 348 Having thus concluded, Brown
then phrased the result in terms of legislative intention. The per-
mission to consolidate with competing lines was "manifestly not
within" the legislature's intent in granting "only a general author-
ity to consolidate," because "[h]ad it occurred to the legislature at
that time that these almost unlimited powers would be used to ob-
tain the control of parallel and competing lines, and to stifle legiti-
mate competition, doubtless a proviso would have been inserted to
meet this possibility. 3 4 9
The demise of the "property/expectancy" distinction in the
analysis of legal interests created by corporate franchises was mir-
rored in the cases involving legal interests which by all previous
accounts would have been "core" examples of vested rights. In Illi-
nois Central R.R. v. Illinois, for example, the Court construed lim-
its on the applicability of a statute that affirmed a grant "in fee" of
the submerged Chicago waterfront. 50 Justice Field noted for the
Court: "The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested. . . than it can abdicate its
police powers in the administration of government and the preser-
vation of the peace."3 51 Here the right claimed to have vested was
embodied in real property, but no attempt was made to square the
decision with the earlier cases holding as vested in individuals the
"interests or property of a nation. '352 Instead, the Court seemingly
held that such grants must be reasonable, since it noted that small
"parcels [that] can be disposed of without impairment of the pub-
lic interest in what remains" might be held to vest. 53
0
347. Id. at 675.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 674, 676.
350. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
351. Id. at 453.
352. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810).
353. Id.
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Also, in Manigault v. Springs, the Court sustained a statute
permitting a person to erect a dam on the same creek on which a
dam he previously erected had been removed pursuant to a con-
tract with an abutting riparian owner.3 4 The contract also pro-
vided that thereafter the creek would be maintained free of ob-
struction. For a unanimous Court, Justice Brown wrote:
This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police power
... is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals. Familiar
instances of this are, where parties enter into contracts, perfectly lawful at
the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or distillery, or carry on a lottery,
all of which are subject to impairment by a change of policy on the part of
the state, prohibiting the establishment or continuance of such traffic;-in
other words, that parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legisla-
ture from enacting laws intended for the public good.,'"
Applying the doctrine of the police power to a contract between
private individuals embodying an existing chose in action, and
reconceiving that doctrine to limit not only rights created by cor-
porate franchise, but also executed contracts made by corporations
with "third parties," the Court permitted the repeal of the central
legal interest protected as "property" under the contract clause.
The holding "that parties, by entering into contracts, may not es-
top the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public
good ' 35 6 demonstrates the extent to which the "property" bound-
ary had collapsed and had become replaced by some conception of
the substantive impact, on legislative power and individual rights,
of holding that any existing legal interest had vested.
B. A Note on Substantive Rights 357
The protracted breakdown of the logic of vested rights was ac-
companied by the reconceptualization of individual rights as sub-
stantive rights against the state. The relationship between the pro-
tection of vested and substantive rights is at this point difficult to
discern. There was certainly no necessary inconsistency perceived
between protecting substantive and vested rights, and many of the
354. 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
355. Id. at 480.
356. Id.
357. For the brief description of substantive rights employed herein, I have relied upon
Kennedy's "The Slaughterhouse Case," in The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought:
1850-1940, supra note *.
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late nineteenth century cases cited as examples of substantive due
process (other than the freedom of contract cases) are decidedly
ambiguous on whether the property right claimed is one defined by
the standing law." ' Of course, many, although by no means all, of
the elements of substantive rights protection that would be
adopted in cases such as Lochner v. New Yorks59 and Adair v.
United States60 were already present in the Slaughterhouse dis-
sents.3 1 The only purpose here, therefore, is to suggest some possi-
ble relationships between the "liberties" the late nineteenth cen-
tury Court took with the earlier contract clause doctrines while
formulating substantive due process.
For present purposes, the important feature of substantive
due process as exemplified in the freedom of contract cases, was
the Court's elevation of certain common law rules, such as those
regulating "at will" employment contracts, to constitutional status
as definitive of the liberty or property interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment. At the same time, however, these rules
somehow lost their character as rules; reconceived as an aspect of
constitutionally protected "freedom," property and contract rights
were viewed as protecting the entitlement of individuals to act free
of any legal regulation at all, rather than to demand that expecta-
tions formed under the rules be protected against disappointment.
The issue in those cases was thus conceived to be whether there
could be regulation of the substantive right by legislation enacted
358. Part of the ambiguity seems attributable to the problem of having federal courts
define substantive property rights. Without any reliance on the states' standing law, federal
judicial protection for "property" could have provided an avenue for the review of all state
common law property rules, especially in light of the Court's opinion in Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (holding that a state court decision in an
eminent domain proceeding could be reviewed for its consistency with the (now federalized)
requirement of just compensation). The Court thus discussed both local law and federal just
compensation principles in determining the extent to which property had been taken. It is
interesting that the problem of interference with the common law authority of state courts
was not mentioned in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., but was central to Holmes' dis-
sent in Muhlker v. Harlem &MR, 197 U.S. 544 (1905), joined by Peckham, Fuller, and White.
In that case, the claim to compensation was based on the contract clause and the theory
that a property owner's rights had vested under a prior decision of the New York courts. In
the substantive rights cases, the common law rules defining the parties' rights seem to dis-
appear into the background; in the vested rights cases they are very much in evidence, as
the source of the right claimed to have vested.
359. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
360. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
361. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-130 (1873); 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 273, 298-99 (1869).
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under the police power or no regulation at all, rather than a choice
between legal regulation by the legislature and legal regulation by
the courts through the adoption of particular common law rules.
The plausibility of conceiving certain common law rules as de-
finitive of constitutionally protected freedom is more a story of the
transformation of private law categories than it is a story of the
development of theories of rights against the state. But in some
ways it drew upon the collapse of the vested right boundary doc-
trines and helped to bring those developments to a conclusion of
sorts. Part of the development in legal thought which resulted in
the Court's protecting "liberty of contract" entailed the abstrac-
tion of the property right and the reconceptualization of legal
rights to include the remedies for their violation. Reconceived as
aspects of a more general autonomy interest in acting free of legal
rules, irrespective of whether those rules infringed upon existing
property rights or altered mere remedies, rights against the state
were recast as substantive limitations on the scope of legislative
power. No distinction was drawn in Lochner and Adair, for exam-
ple, between contract rights and remedies, and in Adair freedom of
contract was both an aspect of personal liberty as well as a right of
property. In helping to complete the transformation in the use of
the categories of "legal right" and "property" in legal analysis,
these cases reflected the accumulated critique of the concepts as
boundary doctrines for vested rights and, unwittingly, presaged
the argument of the theorists in the 1920's about the inevitable
substantive judgment required to protect any legal interest as
vested. To this extent, it seems to make sense to explain the ideas
contributing to the plausibility of substantive due process as hav-
ing worked in opposition to the protection of vested rights under
the contract clause.
For example, there is an important sense in which cases such
as Manigault v. Springs3 62 and Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois36 3 are of a piece with Lochner and Adair. All these cases evi-
dence the abstraction of the property right in legal analysis and
the process by which the public/private distinction, initially ap-
plied only in the "legislative contract" cases to determine which
rules vested legal rights, came to replace completely the property/
362. 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
363. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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expectancy distinction in determining whether a legal interest was
protected against legislative power. What is lacking in these cases
is any discussion similar to that in the earlier cases about whether
the right claimed qualified as a legal "thing."
A more complete description of the interaction between sub-
stantive and vested rights awaits a more detailed description of the
changes in legal thought, particularly those in private law, that
made possible the belief in the substantive right boundary doc-
trines. In any event, it seems unlikely that the constitutional sig-
nificance of these changes can be comprehended without under-
standing how the substantive right came to displace the vested
right in the analysis of constitutionally protected property and
contract rights.
CONCLUSION
At the outset, it was noted that most explanations of the
evolution of constitutional protection for individual rights in the
nineteenth century attempt to account only for the ways in which
the late nineteenth century Court expanded upon the protection of
property and contract rights developed by the Marshall Court.
Refocusing the inquiry on the ways in which the late nineteenth
century Court critiqued and transformed the contract clause doc-
trines has provided an opportunity to rethink the validity of this
emphasis and to question the explanation for the evolution of
rights against the state that were premised upon it.
In particular, the explanations which rely upon the relative
scope and intensity of beliefs in natural law, positivism, formalism,
and instrumentalism assume a continuity in the understanding of
the significance of those beliefs for the judicial role that cannot be
supported. The centrality of the concept of vested rights in theo-
ries of either sort legitimating judicial protection of property and
contract rights distinguishes early nineteenth century legal think-
ers from their early twentieth century counterparts. The account
for that shift has been cast in terms of the categories of legal
thought constituting the logic of vested rights thinking and the col-
lapse of the boundary doctrines which made that logic possible. In
the history of those categories lies a more accurate explanation of
the possibilities available to judges in the different eras, as well as
an understanding of what they thought followed from their duty to
decide the rights against the state cases according to "law."
479
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The new explanation offered herein also questions the major
premise underlying the traditional emphasis in American constitu-
tional history on beliefs in the nature of law or styles of legal rea-
soning-that it is possible to understand the evolution of judicial
protection for individual rights by reference to the necessary impli-
cations of changing commitments to opposing versions of liberal
political theory. This premise is belied by the history of the con-
tract clause. The categories of legal thought that helped convince
earlier generations of legal thinkers of the legitimacy of judicial
protection of rights against the state were those which seemed to
avoid confrontation with the contradictions of liberal political the-
ory which today seem pervasive and fundamental. The attempts to
translate our constitutional past into support for modern constitu-
tional theories therefore appears misguided.
That is not to say that constitutional history is devoid of les-
sons for the present. The finding that the history of these catego-
ries is the story of their disintegration and the resulting exposure
of contradiction is itself significant. In particular, the critique of
the vested right boundary doctrines renders unconvincing the con-
ceptual gambit, limiting judicial protection for rights against the
state to only vested rights, which helped legitimate judicial review
for more than a century and which may inform the Court's recent
contract clause decisions. In general, the failure of the concept of
vested rights to generate a coherent boundary between legislative
power and individual rights is a case study in the failure of liberal
legalism to resolve the central problems posed by liberal political
theory. Despite the failure to resolve these problems, the cases
must be decided; but the belief that this process entails anything
more certain than the identification of acts of justice or injustice
seems an anachronism which somehow survives the recurring col-
lapse of its major conceptual supports.
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